Parliament voted on the Demands for Grants for the Ministry of Home Affairs on May 02, 2012. During the debate, MPs expressed concern over the status of police forces in different States of the country.  They emphasised  the need to augment the capability of police forces. Though ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ are State subjects, the union government provides assistance to States for strengthening their forces.  For instance, the Ministry of Home Affairs has been implementing a non-plan scheme for ‘Modernization of Police Forces’ since 1969-70.  Under the scheme assistance is provided in the form of grants-in-aid towards construction of secure police stations, outposts, for purchase of vehicles, equipment etc.  (To know more about the scheme, see an earlier blog post on the issue.) At the all India level, the sanctioned strength of State Police equals 20.6 lakh personnel.  Though there exist wide variations across States, at an average this amounts to 174 police personnel per lakh population.  However, the actual ratio is much lower because of high vacancies in the police forces.  At the aggregate level, 24% positions are vacant. The table below provides data on the strength of state police forces as in Jan, 2011

State Sanctioned strength Sanctioned policemen/ lakh of population Vacancy
Andhra Pradesh 1,31,099 155 31%
Arunachal Pradesh 11,955 966 42%
Assam 62,149 200 12%
Bihar 85,939 88 27%
Chhattisgarh 50,869 207 18%
Goa 6,108 348 16%
Gujarat 87,877 151 27%
Haryana 61,307 248 28%
Himachal Pradesh 17,187 256 22%
Jammu & Kashmir 77,464 575 6%
Jharkhand 73,005 235 30%
Karnataka 91,256 155 10%
Kerala 49,394 141 7%
Madhya Pradesh 83,524 115 9%
Maharashtra 1,53,148 139 10%
Manipur 31,081 1,147 26%
Meghalaya 12,268 469 17%
Mizoram 11,246 1,112 6%
Nagaland 24,226 1,073 0%
Orissa 53,291 130 18%
Punjab 79,565 291 14%
Rajasthan 79,554 118 11%
Sikkim 5,421 886 27%
Tamil Nadu 1,20,441 178 15%
Tripura 44,310 1,224 17%
Uttar Pradesh 3,68,260 184 59%
Uttarakhand 20,775 211 24%
West Bengal 72,998 81 18%
A&N Islands 4,417 1,018 22%
Chandigarh 7,873 695 22%
D&N Haveli 325 114 13%
Daman & Diu 281 140 6%
Delhi 81,467 441 1%
Lakshadweep 349 478 36%
Puducherry 3,941 352 25%
All India 20,64,370 174 24%

Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 90, 13th March, 2012  and Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1042, March 20, 2012

After months of discussion,  the issue of FDI in retail is being deliberated in the Lok Sabha today.  In September 2012, the Cabinet had approved 51% of FDI in multi-brand retail (stores selling more than one brand).  Under these regulations, foreign retail giants like Walmart and Tesco can set up shop in India.  Discussions on permitting FDI in retail have focused on the effect of FDI on unorganised retailers, farmers and consumers. Earlier, the central government commissioned the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to examine the impact of organised retail on unorganised retail. The Standing Committee on Commerce also tabled a report on Foreign and Domestic Investment in the Retail Sector in May, 2009 while the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) released a discussion paper examining FDI in multi-brand retail in July, 2010.  Other experts have also made arguments – both in support of, and in opposition to, the move to permit FDI in retail sales. The table below summarises some of these arguments from the perspective of various stakeholders as collated from the above reports examining the issue.

Stakeholder

Supporting arguments (source)

Opposing arguments (source)

Unorganised retail
  • No evidence of impact on job losses (ICRIER).
  • The rate of closure of unorganised retail shops (4.2%) is lower than international standards (ICRIER).
  • Evidence from Indonesia and China show that traditional and modern retail can coexist and grow  (Reardon and Gulati).
  • Majority of small retailers keen to remain in operation even after emergence of organised retail (ICRIER).
  •  Unorganised retailers in the vicinity of organised retailers saw their volume of business and profit decline but this effect weakens over time (ICRIER).
  • Other studies have estimated that traditional fruit and vegetable retailers experienced a 20-30% decline in incomes with the presence of supermarkets (Singh).
  • There is potential for employment loss in the value chain. A supermarket may create fewer jobs for the volume of produce handled (Singh).
  • Unemployment to increase as a result of retailers practicing product bundling (selling goods in combinations and bargains) and predatory pricing (Standing Committee).
Farmers
  • Significant positive impact on farmers as a result of direct sales to organised retailers.  For instance, cauliflower farmers receive a 25% higher price selling directly to organised retailers instead of government regulated markets (mandis).  Profits for farmers selling to organised retailers are about 60% higher than when selling to mandis (ICRIER).
  • Organised retail could remove supply chain inefficiencies through direct purchase from farmers and investment in better storage, distribution and transport systems.  FDI, in particular, could bring in new technology and ideas (DIPP).
  •  Current organised retail procures 60-70% from wholesale markets rather than farmers. There has been no significant impact on backend infrastructure investment (Singh).
  • There are other issues like irrigation, technology and credit in agriculture which FDI may not address (Singh).
  • Increased monopolistic strength could force farmers to sell at lower prices (Standing Committee).
Consumers
  • Organised retail lowers prices. Consumer spending increases with the entry of organised retail and lower income groups tend to save more (ICRIER).
  • It will lead to better quality and safety standards of products (DIPP).
  •  Evidence from some Latin American countries (Mexico, Nicaragua, Argentina), Africa (Kenya, Madagascar) and Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, India) reveal that supermarket prices for fruits and vegetables were higher than traditional retail prices (Singh).
  • Even with lower prices at supermarkets, low income households may prefer traditional retailers because they live far from supermarkets, they can bargain with traditional retailers and buy loose items (Singh).
  • Monopolistic power for retailers could result in high prices for consumers.

Source: ICRIER [1.  "Impact of Organized Retailing on the Unorganized Sector", ICRIER, September 2008]; Standing Committee [2.  "Foreign and domestic investment in retail sector", Standing Committee on Commerce, May 13, 2009]; Singh (2011) [3. "FDI in Retail: Misplaced Expectations and Half-truths",  Sukhpal Singh, Economic and Political Weekly, December 17, 2011];  Reardon and Gulati (2008)  [4. "Rise of supermarkets and their development implications," IFPRI Discussion Paper, Thomas Reardon and Ashok Gulati, February 2008.]; DIPP [5. "Discussion Paper on FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading", Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, July 6, 2010]