The Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on April 26, 2010, and was passed by the Lok Sabha on May 6 (See Bill Summary here). The Bill was not referred to a Standing Committee of Parliament. The Bill has been introduced to allow India to ratify the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Convention against Torture requires member countries to bring their domestic legislation in conformity with the provisions of the Convention. The main features of the Bill, and the issues are highlighted below (For the PRS Legislative Brief on the Bill, click here). Main features of the Torture Bill
| Features | Explanation |
| Definition of ‘torture’ | A public servant or any person with a public servant’s consent commits torture if all three conditions are met:
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| When is torture punishable? |
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| Conditions under which courts can admit complaints |
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The definition of torture The definition of torture raises the following issues:
Dilution of existing laws on torture The Bill makes it difficult for those accused of torture to be tried. This is because (a) complaints against acts of torture have to be made within six months, and (b) the previous sanction of the appropriate government has to be sought before a court can entertain a complaint.
| Relevant provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Bill. | ||
| Subject | Criminal Procedure Code | Bill |
| Requirement of government sanction | Sanction needed if (a) a public servant is not removable except with the sanction of the appropriate government, and (b) the public servant was acting in the course of his duties. | Prior sanction of the appropriate government needed in all cases. |
| Time limits for filing complaints | Time-limits exist for offences punishable with maximum imprisonment of up to three years. No time limits for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of more than three years. | There is a time-limit though torture is punishable with maximum imprisonment of up to ten years. Complaints have to be filed within six months. |
| Sources: Sections 197 and 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; PRS. | ||
Independent authority to investigate complaints There is no independent mechanism/ authority to investigate complaints of torture. The investigating agency in most cases of torture would be the police. In many cases, personnel of the police would also be alleged to have committed torture. In such cases, the effectiveness of investigations in incidents of torture will be affected.
| Independent authorities in other countries to investigate incidents of torture. | |
| Country | Authority/ Institution |
| France | Comptroller General of the places of deprivation of liberty |
| Germany | The Federal Agency for the Prevention of Torture |
| New Zealand | Human Rights Commission, Police Complaints Authority, Children’s Commissioner |
| United Kingdom | 18 different organisations, including Independent Monitoring Board, Independent Custody Visiting Associations, etc. |
| Sources: National Preventive Mechanisms, UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture; PRS. | |
Police Personnel sent for trials under existing laws, and convictions 
The last few months saw a number of allegations of corruption in issues such as contracts for the Commonwealth Games, allocation of 2G Spectrum, and the building of the Adarsh housing society. Professor Kaushik Basu, the Chief Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, has proposed a modification in order to make the anti-corruption law in the country more effective. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 penalizes both bribe giving and taking. Bribe giving is punishable under the Act with imprisonment ranging between six months to five years. He argues that bribe giving should be legalized. Professor Basu distinguishes “harassment bribes”, which he defines as “bribes that people often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to” from the remaining, “Non-Harassment Bribes” which would involve illegal benefits accruing to the bribe giver at a potential cost to the public interest. He argues that legalization of harassment bribes would reduce the nexus between the giver (victim) and the taker of a bribe. Giving complete immunity to the bribe-giver would ensure higher reporting and co-operation of the giver in bringing to justice the bribe taker. The present law acts as a deterrent to reporting of bribery. Courts have also highlighted this issue. The High Court of Delhi in the Bharadwaaj Media Case (2007) observed that a “bribe giver is normally on the mercy of the officials and babus who compel him to pay bribe even for lawful work.” The Court further observed that “Instead of expressing gratefulness to the persons who expose corruption, if the institutions start taking action against those who expose corruption, corruption is bound to progress day and night.” It can be inferred from the judgement that steps ought to be taken to provide protection to those exposing bribery. The proposed legalization of bribe-giving may result in increased reporting of bribery and co-operation of the victim during prosecution. The fear that a bribe giver may report the public official could reduce corruption, at least in terms of harassment bribes. However, this proposal may reduce the stigma attached to bribe-giving and result in corrosion of morality. Much of the recent debate around corruption and the Lok Pal Bill revolve around effective prosecution. This paper looks at the incentive structure for reporting bribe-giving, and merits public debate.
