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In a landmark judgment on April 12, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the provision in the Right to Education Act, 2009 that makes it mandatory for all schools (government and private) except private, unaided minority schools to reserve 25% of their seats for children belonging to “weaker section and disadvantaged group”. The verdict was given by a three-judge bench namely Justice S.H. Kapadia (CJI), Justice Swatanter Kumar and Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan. However, the judgment was not unanimous. Justice Radhakrishnan gave a dissenting view to the majority judgment. According to news reports (here and here), some school associations are planning to file review petitions against the Supreme Court order (under Article 137 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may review any judgment or order made by it. A review petition may be filed if there is (a) discovery of new evidence, (b) an error apparent on the face of the record, or (c) any other sufficient reason). In this post, we summarise the views of the judges. Background of the petition The 86th (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2002 added Article 21A to the Constitution which makes it mandatory for the State to provide free and compulsory education to all children from the age of six to 14 years (fundamental right). The Parliament enacted the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 to give effect to this amendment. The Act provides that children between the ages of six and 14 years have the right to free and compulsory education in a neighbourhood school. It also lays down the minimum norms that each school has to follow in order to get legal recognition. The Act required government schools to provide free and compulsory education to all admitted children. Similarly, aided schools have to provide free and compulsory education proportionate to the funding received, subject to a minimum of 25%. However, controversy erupted over Section 12(1)(c) and (2) of the Act, which required private, unaided schools to admit at least 25% of students from SCs, STs, low-income and other disadvantaged or weaker groups. The Act stated that these schools shall be reimbursed for either their tuition charge or the per-student expenditure in government schools, whichever is lower. After the Act was notified on April 1, 2010, the Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of this provision on the ground that it impinged on their right to run educational institutions without government interference. Summary of the judgment Majority The Act is constitutionally valid and shall apply to (a) government controlled schools, (b) aided schools (including minority administered schools), and (c) unaided, non-minority schools. The reasons are given below: First, Article 21A makes it obligatory on the State to provide free and compulsory education to all children between 6 and 14 years of age. However, the manner in which the obligation shall be discharged is left to the State to determine by law. Therefore, the State has the freedom to decide whether it shall fulfill its obligation through its own schools, aided schools or unaided schools. The 2009 Act is “child centric” and not “institution centric”. The main question was whether the Act violates Article 19(1)(g) which gives every citizen the right to practice a profession or carry out any occupation, trade or business. However, the Constitution provides that Article 19(1)(g) may be circumscribed by Article 19(6), which allow reasonable restriction over this right in the interest of the general public. The Court stated that since “education” is recognized as a charitable activity [see TMA Pai Foundation vs State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481] reasonable restriction may apply. Second, the Act places a burden on the State as well as parents/guardians to ensure that every child has the right to education. Thus, the right to education “envisages a reciprocal agreement between the State and the parents and it places an affirmative burden on all stakeholders in our civil society.” The private, unaided schools supplement the primary obligation of the State to provide for free and compulsory education to the specified category of students. Third, TMA Pai and P.A. Inamdar judgments hold that the right to establish and administer educational institutions fall within Article 19(1)(g). It includes right to admit students and set up reasonable fee structure. However, these principles were applied in the context of professional/higher education where merit and excellence have to be given due weightage. This does not apply to a child seeking admission in Class I. Also, Section 12(1)(c) of the Act seeks to remove financial obstacle. Therefore, the 2009 Act should be read with Article 19(6) which provides for reasonable restriction on Article 19(1)(g). However, the government should clarify the position with regard to boarding schools and orphanages. The Court also ruled that the 2009 Act shall not apply to unaided, minority schools since they are protected by Article 30(1) (all minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice). This right of the minorities is not circumscribed by reasonable restriction as is the case under Article 19(1)(g). Dissenting judgment Article 21A casts an obligation on the State to provide free and compulsory education to children of the age of 6 to 14 years. The obligation is not on unaided non-minority and minority educational institutions. Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act can be operationalised only on the principles of voluntariness, autonomy and consensus for unaided schools and not on compulsion or threat of non-recognition. The reasons for such a judgment are given below: First, Article 21A says that the “State shall provide” not “provide for”. Therefore, the constitutional obligation is on the State and not on non-state actors to provide free and compulsory education to a specified category of children. Also, under Article 51A(k) of the Constitution, parents or guardians have a duty to provide opportunities for education to their children but not a constitutional obligation. Second, each citizen has the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution “investing his own capital” under Article 19(1)(g). This right can be curtailed in the interest of the general public by imposing reasonable restrictions. Citizens do not have any constitutional obligation to start an educational institution. Therefore, according to judgments of TMA Pai and PA Inamdar, they do not have any constitutional obligation to share seats with the State or adhere to a fee structure determined by the State. Compelling them to do so would amount to nationalization of seats and would constitute serious infringement on the autonomy of the institutions. Rights guaranteed to the unaided non-minority and minority educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30(1) can only be curtailed through a constitutional amendment (for example, insertion of Article 15(5) that allows reservation of seats in private educational institutions). Third, no distinction can be drawn between unaided minority and non-minority schools with regard to appropriation of quota by the State. Other issues related to the 2009 Act Apart from the issue of reservation, the RTE Act raises other issues such as lack of accountability of government schools and lack of focus on learning outcomes even though a number of studies have pointed to low levels of learning among school children. (For a detailed analysis, please see PRS Brief on the Bill).
The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021 was introduced in Lok Sabha today. It seeks to dissolve certain existing appellate bodies and transfer their functions (such as adjudication of appeals) to existing judicial bodies (mainly high courts) (see Table 1). It also amends the Finance Act, 2017, to bring certain provisions (such as qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances of tribunal members) under the purview of the Bill. Currently, these provisions are notified through Rules under the Finance Act, 2017.
Note that the 2017 Act reorganised the Indian tribunal system to ensure uniformity in their administration by amalgamating certain tribunals based on the similarity in their functional domain. It also delegated powers to the central government to make Rules to provide for the qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances, removal, and other conditions of service for chairpersons and members of these tribunals.
This Bill replaces an Ordinance with similar provisions that was promulgated in April 2021. The 2021 Ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court over its compliance with past Supreme Court judgements. In July 2021, the Court struck down certain provisions of the Ordinance, such as the four-year term of office for members, and the minimum age bar of 50 years to be appointed as a member of a tribunal. Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of key provisions of the 2021 Bill with the 2021 Ordinance and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgement. The Bill does not conform to the judgement of the Supreme Court and retains the provisions of the Ordinance that were struck down by the Court.
For an analysis of the 2021 Ordinance, please see our note here. For more details on the evolution of the tribunal system in India, please see our note.
Table 1: Transfer of functions of key appellate bodies as proposed under the Bill
Appellate body |
Role |
Proposed entity |
Appellate Tribunal under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 |
Adjudication of appeals against the Board of Film Certification |
High Court |
Appellate Board under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
Appellate Board under the Copyright Act, 1957 |
Adjudication of certain disputes and appeals against orders of the Registrar of Copyright. Disputes include those related to publications and term of the copyright |
Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of a High Court* |
Authority for Advance Rulings under the Customs Act, 1962 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Customs Authority for advance rulings |
High Court |
Appellate Board under The Patents Act, 1970 |
Adjudication of appeals against decisions of the Controller on certain matters. Matters include applications for patents and restoration of patents. |
High Court |
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 |
Adjudication of:
|
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Highway Administration on matters including, grant of lease or licence of highway land, removal of unauthorised occupation, and prevention of damage to highway. |
Civil Court# |
Appellate Tribunal under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 |
Adjudication of appeals against certain orders of Registrar or Plant Varieties and Farmer Rights Authority |
High Court |
Appellate Board under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
Notes: * Constituted under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; # Refers to a Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Parent Acts of the appellate bodies; PRS.
Table 2: Key provisions in the 2021 Bill and the Ordinance vis-a-vis the Supreme Court judgements
Provisions |
2021 Ordinance |
Supreme Court Judgement of July 2021 |
2021 Bill |
Term of office of Chairperson and members |
Four-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
The Court stated that a short tenure of members (such as three years) along with provisions of re-appointment increases the influence and control of the Executive over the judiciary. In a short tenure, by the time the members achieve the required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term gets over. This prevents enhancement of adjudicatory experience, thereby, impacting the efficacy of tribunals. The Court struck down the provision of four -year term and reiterated its past judgements, which recommended a five-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Minimum age requirement for appointment of Chairperson and members |
50 years |
The Court observed that the minimum age requirement of 50 years violates past Court judgements, where the Court has stated that advocates with at least 10 years of relevant experience must be eligible to be appointed as judicial members, as that is the qualification required for a High Court judge. Such a high age limit also prevents the recruitment of young talent. The provision was struck down. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Time limit for appointments |
Preferably within three months from the date of the recommendations of the search-cum-selection committee. |
The Court noted that not mandating the central government to make appointments within three months (from the date of recommendation of the search-cum-selection committee) leads to delay in the appointment of members. This impacts the functioning and efficacy of tribunals. The provision was struck down over non-compliance with past judgements, which mandated the appointments to be made within three months. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Number of recommendations for a post |
Two names for each post. |
The Court stated that the recommendations for appointment of members by the search-cum-selection committee should be final. The Executive must not be allowed to exercise any discretion in matter of appointments in a tribunal. The Court struck down the provision and reiterated its past judgement, which specified that the selection committee must suggest one name for each post. The Committee may recommend one name in wait list. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021; The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Madras Bar Association vs Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 000502 of 2021; PRS.