The government is considering a number of measures to tackle corruption such as the formation of the office of the Lokpal or Ombudsman to investigate corruption cases, the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 that requires judges to declare their assets, lays down enforceable standards of conduct for judges, and establishes a process for removal of the Supreme Court and High Court judges (see PRS Analysis) and the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Persons Making the Disclosure Bill, 2010. In 2004, following the death of whistleblower Satyendra Dubey, the government issued a notification laying down certain guidelines for whistleblowing and protecting whistleblowers.  It introduced the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Persons Making the Disclosure Bill, 2010 in August 2010 to give statutory backing to the 2004 government resolution.  Commonly known as the Whistleblower’s Bill, it seeks to protect whistleblowers i.e. persons making a public interest disclosure related to an act of corruption, misuse of power or criminal offence by a public servant.  It designates the Central and State Vigilance Commissions to receive disclosures from whistleblowers and lays down safeguards for protection of whistleblowers (see PRS Analysis). The Bill was referred to the Departmentally related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice.  The Committee presented its report on June 9, 2011. Key recommendations of the Standing Committee

  • § The Bill seeks to establish a mechanism to register complaints on any allegation of corruption or wilful misuse of power by a public servant.  The Committee broadly agreed with the provisions of the Bill but hoped that the government would consider the recommendations and adopt them wherever found appropriate.
  • § The Bill covers any complaint under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; wilful misuse of power, and a criminal offence by a public servant.  The Committee suggested that the scope of the Bill may be widened to include offences such as maladministration and human rights violations.  Specifically, the Bill should cover accrual of wrongful gain to a third party.  Also, the definition of “public servant” in the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could be adopted for this Bill.
  • § The Committee proposed that the defence forces and intelligence organisations should be included within the ambit of the Bill.  There could be reasonable exceptions based on operational needs of the forces.  Alternately, a separate authority could be set up for these exempted agencies.  It added that the Bill should cover members of the Council of Ministers, the judiciary (including higher judiciary) and regulatory authorities.
  • § The Bill states that a public interest disclosure can be made only to the Central or State Vigilance Commissions (VCs).  The Committee is of the opinion that this may restrict access especially to population in remote areas.  It recommended that the Rules should provide for a smooth and convenient system.  The Committee added that if there are multiple points at which complaints can be made, the identity of the complainant should be strictly protected.
  • § The Bill does not allow anonymous complaints.  The Committee however suggested that if the anonymous complaints have supporting documents that substantiates the claims, the VCs can investigate it.  It also advised that an alternative mechanism could be set up within or outside the Bill for inquiring into anonymous complaints.
  • § The Committee recommended that there should be a foolproof mechanism to ensure that the identity of the complainant is not compromised with at any cost.  This is especially important because without such a mechanism it would deter prospective complainants due to fear of harassment and victimisation.
  • § The Bill allows the VCs to reveal the identity of the complainant to the head of the organisation if it is necessary to do so.  The Committee recommended that the identity of the complainant should not be revealed to the head of the organisation without the written consent of the complainant.
  • § The Committee felt that undue burden should not be placed on the complainant to provide proof to substantiate his case.  As long as he is able to make out a prima facie case, the VCs should follow up on the case.
  • § The Committee is of the view that the VCs should inform the complainant about the outcome of the complaint.  Also, the VCs should give reasons if it decides to dismiss a complaint and the complainant should be given a reasonable hearing if he is not satisfied with the dismissal.
  • § The Committee proposed that there should be a time limit for conducting discreet inquiry by the VCs, for inquiry by the head of the organisation and for taking action on the recommendations of the VCs.  The authority would have to give reasons in writing if it wants the time limit to be extended.  There should also be some mechanism to ensure that the directions of the VC are not avoided to protect the wrongdoer.
  • § The Bill states that the VCs shall not entertain any complaints made five years after the action.  However, the Committee is not convinced that this restriction should be prescribed.  If at all there has to be a time limit, exceptions should be made in case of complaints which prima facie reveal offences of a grave nature.
  • § The Committee recommended that the term “victimisation” should be defined and the whistleblower should be provided with sufficient protection to protect him from violence.  Also, witnesses and other persons who support the whistleblower should be accorded the same protection.
  • § The Committee strongly recommended that there should be a mechanism to ensure that the orders of the VCs are complied with. Stringent action should be taken against any person who does not comply with the order.
  • § The Committee felt that the penalty for frivolous or malafide complaints was too high and should be substantially reduced.  Also, while deciding whether a disclosure is frivolous, the intention of the complainant should be examined rather than the outcome of the inquiry.  The complainant should also have the right to appeal to the High Court.

 

On October 18, it was reportein the news that the central government has been given more time for framing rules under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.  The President had given assent to this Act in December 2019 and the Act came into force in January 2020.   Similarly, about two years have passed since the new labour codes were passed by Parliament, and the final Rules are yet to be published.  This raises the question how long the government can take to frame Rules and what is the procedure guiding this.  In this blog, we discuss the same.

Under the Constitution, the Legislature has the power to make laws and the Executive is responsible for implementing them.  Often, the Legislature enacts a law covering the general principles and policies, and delegates the power to the Executive for specifying certain details for the implementation of a law.  For example, the Citizenship Amendment Act provides who will be eligible for citizenship.  The certificate of registration or naturalization to a person will be issued, subject to conditions, restrictions, and manner as may be prescribed by the central government through Rules.  Delay in framing Rules results in delay in implementing the law, since the necessary details are not available.  For example, new labour codes provide a social security scheme for gig economy workers such as Swiggy and Zomato delivery persons and Uber and Ola drivers.  These benefits as per these Codes are yet to be rolled out as the Rules are yet to be notified.

Timelines and checks and balances for adherence

Each House of Parliament has a Committee of Members to examine Rules, Regulations, and government orders in detail called the Committee on Subordinate Legislation.  Over the years, the recommendations of these Committees have shaped the evolution of the procedure and timelines for framing subordinate legislation.  These are reflected in the Manual of Parliamentary Procedures issued by the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, which provides detailed guidelines.

Ordinarily, Rules, Regulations, and bye-laws are to be framed within six months from the date on which the concerned Act came into force.   Post that, the concerned Ministry is required to seek an extension from the Parliamentary Committees on Subordinate Legislation.  The reason for the extension needs to be stated.   Such extensions may be granted for a maximum period of three months at a time.  For example, in case of Rules under the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, at an earlier instance, an extension was granted on account of the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Activity

Timeline

  • Publication of Rules, Regulations, and Bye-Laws, where public consultation is required under the Act
  • A minimum of 30 days for public feedback
  • Consequently, for publication,
  • Three months, if the number of suggestions is small
  • Six months, if the number of suggestions is large
  • Publication of Rules, Regulations, and Bye-Laws, not requiring public consultation
  • Six months from the date on which the concerned Act came into force
  • Any extension for publication
  • A maximum of three months at a time

To ensure monitoring, every Ministry is required to prepare a quarterly report on the status of subordinate legislation not framed and share it with the Ministry of Law and Justice.  These reports are not available in the public domain.

Recommendations to address delays

Over the years, the Subordinate Legislation Committees in both Houses have observed multiple instances of non-adherence to the above timelines by various Ministries.  To address this, they have made the following key recommendations:

  • Statement on reasons for the delay: In 2011, Rajya Sabha Committee recommended that while laying Rules/Regulations before Parliament, the Ministry should also lay a statement explaining the reasons for the delay, if any.
  • Scrutiny of delays by the Cabinet Secretary:  In 2016, the Rajya Sabha Committee recommended that the Cabinet Secretary should continue the practice of calling the Secretaries of concerned Ministries/Departments, to explain the reasons for the delay in framing the subordinate legislation.  Each Ministry should send a quarterly status report to the Cabinet Secretariat.
  • Revisiting guidelines: In 2011, Lok Sabha Committee recommended that the 1986 guidelines should be revisited and all major recommendations of the Committee should be incorporated.  However, as per the Action Taken Report, the government observed that the ministries consider the extant guidelines adequate and these guidelines were re-iterated in 2012.

Are all Rules under an Act required to be framed?

Usually, the expressions used in an Act are “The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act.”, or “as may be prescribed”.  Hence, it may appear that the laws aim to enable rule-making instead of mandate rule-making.  However, certain provisions of an Act cannot be brought into force if the required details have not been prescribed under the Rules.  This makes the implementation of the Act consequent to the publication of respective Rules.  For example, the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022 enables the police and certain other persons to collect identity-related information about certain persons.  It provides that the manner of collection of such information may be specified by the central government.  Unless the manner is prescribed, such collection cannot take place.

That said, some other rule-making powers may be enabling in nature and subject to discretion by the concerned Ministry.  In 2016, Rajya Sabha Committee on Subordinate Legislation examined the status of Rules and Regulations to be framed under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001.  It observed that the Ministry of Power had held that two Rules and three Regulations under this Act were not necessary.   The Ministry of Law and Justice had opined that those deemed not necessary were enabling provisions meant for unforeseen circumstances.  The Rajya Sabha Committee (2016) had recommended that where the Ministry does not feel the need for framing subordinate legislation, the Minister should table a statement in Parliament, stating reasons for such a conclusion.

Some key issues related to subordinate legislation

The Legislature delegates the power to specify details for the implementation of a law to the Executive through powers for framing subordinate legislation.  Hence, it is important to ensure these are well-scrutinised so that they are within the limits envisaged in the law.

  • Capacity of Committees on Subordinate Legislation:  Parliamentary Committees on Subordinate Legislation have the responsibility to examine Rules in detail.  In past, they have examined some key rules, regulations, and notifications regarding e-commerceliability of internet-based services, and demonetisation.  However, usually, they are able to examine only a fraction of subordinate legislation in detail.  For more details, please see the PRS discussion paper here.
  • Uniformity of standards:  Countries such as UKUSAAustralia, and Canada have overarching legislation for regulating the framing of subordinate legislation.  These laws provide for the manner of public consultation, timelines, drafting standards, and a common register.  India does not have any similar law.  In India, the detail whether public consultation for subordinate legislation is required or not, is specified in respective Acts.  The General Clauses Act, 1897 also governs certain aspects of the framing of subordinate legislation.  In addition, the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 guides the pre-legislative consultation on subordinate legislation.

See here for our recently published analysis of the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Rules, 2022, notified in September 2022.  Also, check out PRS analysis of: