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Recently, the Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare submitted its report to the Parliament on the National Commission for Human Resource for Health Bill, 2011. The objective of the Bill is to “ensure adequate availability of human resources in the health sector in all states”. It seeks to set up the National Commission for Human Resources for Health (NCHRH), National Board for Health Education (NBHE), and the National Evaluation and Assessment Council (NEAC) in order to determine and regulate standards of health education in the country. It separates regulation of the education sector from that of professions such as law, medicine and nursing, and establishes professional councils at the national and state levels to regulate the professions. See here for PRS Bill Summary. The Standing Committee recommended that this Bill be withdrawn and a revised Bill be introduced in Parliament after consulting stakeholders. It felt that concerns of the professional councils such as the Medical Council of India and the Dental Council of India were not adequately addressed. Also, it noted that the powers and functions of the NCHRH and the National Commission on Higher Education and Research (to be established under the Higher Education and Research Bill, 2011 to regulate the higher education sector in the country) were overlapping in many areas. Finally, it also expressed concern over the acute shortage of qualified health workers in the country as well as variations among states and rural and urban areas. As per the 2001 Census, the estimated density of all health workers (qualified and unqualified) is about 20% less than the World Health Organisation’s norm of 2.5 health workers per 1000 population. See here for PRS Standing Committee Summary. Shortfall of health workers in rural areas Public health care in rural areas is provided through a multi-tier network. At the lowest level, there are sub health-centres for every population of 5,000 in the plains and 3,000 in hilly areas. The next level consists of Primary Health Centres (PHCs) for every population of 30,000 in the plains and 20,000 in the hills. Generally, each PHC caters to a cluster of Gram Panchayats. PHCs are required to have one medical officer and 14 other staff, including one Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM). There are Community Health Centres (CHCs) for every population of 1,20,000 in the plains and 80,000 in hilly areas. These sub health centres, PHCs and CHCs are linked to district hospitals. As on March 2011, there are 14,8124 sub health centres, 23,887 PHCs and 4809 CHCs in the country.[i] Sub-Health Centres and Primary Health Centres
Table 1: State-wise comparison of vacancy in PHCs
Doctors at PHCs |
ANM at PHCs and Sub-Centres |
|||||
State | Sanctioned post | Vacancy | % of vacancy | Sanctioned post | Vacancy | % of vacancy |
Chhattisgarh | 1482 | 1058 | 71 | 6394 | 964 | 15 |
West Bengal | 1807 | 801 | 44 | 10,356 | NA | 0 |
Maharashtra | 3618 | 1326 | 37 | 21,122 | 0 | 0 |
Uttar Pradesh | 4509 | 1648 | 36 | 25,190 | 2726 | 11 |
Mizoram | 57 | 20 | 35 | 388 | 0 | 0 |
Madhya Pradesh | 1238 | 424 | 34 | 11,904 | 0 | 0 |
Gujarat | 1123 | 345 | 31 | 7248 | 817 | 11 |
Andaman & Nicobar Isld | 40 | 12 | 30 | 214 | 0 | 0 |
Odisha | 725 | 200 | 28 | 7442 | 0 | 0 |
Tamil Nadu | 2326 | 622 | 27 | 9910 | 136 | 1 |
Himachal Pradesh | 582 | 131 | 22 | 2213 | 528 | 24 |
Uttarakhand | 299 | 65 | 22 | 2077 | 0 | 0 |
Manipur | 240 | 48 | 20 | 984 | 323 | 33 |
Haryana | 651 | 121 | 19 | 5420 | 386 | 7 |
Sikkim | 48 | 9 | 19 | 219 | 0 | 0 |
Meghalaya | 127 | 23 | 18 | 667 | 0 | 0 |
Delhi | 22 | 3 | 14 | 43 | 0 | 0 |
Goa | 46 | 5 | 11 | 260 | 20 | 8 |
Karnataka | 2310 | 221 | 10 | 11,180 | 0 | 0 |
Kerala | 1204 | 82 | 7 | 4232 | 59 | 1 |
Andhra Pradesh | 2424 | 76 | 3 | 24,523 | 2876 | 12 |
Rajasthan | 1478 | 6 | 0.4 | 14,348 | 0 | 0 |
Arunachal Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Assam | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Bihar | 2078 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Chandigarh | 0 | 0 | NA | 17 | 0 | 0 |
Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 6 | 0 | NA | 40 | 0 | 0 |
Daman & Diu | 3 | 0 | NA | 26 | 0 | 0 |
Jammu & Kashmir | 750 | 0 | NA | 2282 | 0 | 0 |
Jharkhand | 330 | 0 | NA | 4288 | 0 | 0 |
Lakshadweep | 4 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Nagaland | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Puducherry | 37 | 0 | NA | 72 | 0 | 0 |
Punjab | 487 | 0 | NA | 4044 | 0 | 0 |
Tripura | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
India | 30,051 | 7,246 | 24 | 1,77,103 | 8,835 | 5 |
Sources: National Rural Health Mission (available here), PRS.Note: The data for all states is as of March 2011 except for some states where data is as of 2010. For doctors, these states are Bihar, UP, Mizoram and Delhi. For ANMs, these states are Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. |
Community Health Centres
Table 2: Vacancies in CHCs of medical specialists
Surgeons | Gynaecologists | Physicians | Paediatricians | |
State |
% of vacancy |
|||
Andaman & NicobarIsland | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Andhra Pradesh | 74 | 0 | 45 | 3 |
Arunachal Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Assam | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Bihar | 41 | 44 | 60 | 38 |
Chandigarh | 50 | 40 | 50 | 100 |
Chhattisgarh | 85 | 85 | 90 | 84 |
Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Daman & Diu | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
Delhi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Goa | 20 | 20 | 67 | 66 |
Gujarat | 77 | 73 | 0 | 91 |
Haryana | 71 | 80 | 94 | 85 |
Himachal Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Jammu & Kashmir | 34 | 34 | 53 | 63 |
Jharkhand | 45 | 0 | 81 | 61 |
Karnataka | 33 | NA | NA | NA |
Kerala | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Lakshadweep | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 |
Madhya Pradesh | 78 | 69 | 76 | 58 |
Maharashtra | 21 | 0 | 34 | 0 |
Manipur | 100 | 94 | 94 | 87 |
Meghalaya | 50 | NA | 100 | 50 |
Mizoram | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Nagaland | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Odisha | 44 | 45 | 62 | 41 |
Puducherry | 0 | 0 | 100 | NA |
Punjab | 16 | 36 | 40 | 48 |
Rajasthan | 57% | 46 | 49 | 24 |
Sikkim | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Tamil Nadu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Tripura | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Uttar Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Uttarakhand | 69 | 63 | 74 | 40 |
West Bengal | 0 | 57 | 0 | 78 |
India | 56 | 47 | 59 | 49 |
Sources: National Rural Health Mission (available here), PRS. |
[i]. “Rural Healthcare System in India”, National Rural Health Mission (available here).
On Monday, December 4, the Chairman of Rajya Sabha disqualified two Members of Parliament (MPs) from the House under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (better known as the anti-defection law) for having defected from their party.[1] These members were elected on a Janata Dal (United) ticket. The Madras High Court is also hearing petitions filed by 18 MLAs who were disqualified by the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly in September 2017 under the anti-defection law. Allegations of legislators defecting in violation of the law have been made in several other states including Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Nagaland, Telangana and Uttarakhand in recent years.[2] In this context, we explain the anti-defection law.
What is the anti-defection law?
Aaya Ram Gaya Ram was a phrase that became popular in Indian politics after a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed his party thrice within the same day in 1967. The anti-defection law sought to prevent such political defections which may be due to reward of office or other similar considerations.[3]
The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution in 1985. It lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on grounds of defection by the Presiding Officer of a legislature based on a petition by any other member of the House. A legislator is deemed to have defected if he either voluntarily gives up the membership of his party or disobeys the directives of the party leadership on a vote. This implies that a legislator defying (abstaining or voting against) the party whip on any issue can lose his membership of the House. The law applies to both Parliament and state assemblies.
Are there any exceptions under the law?
Yes, legislators may change their party without the risk of disqualification in certain circumstances. The law allows a party to merge with or into another party provided that at least two-thirds of its legislators are in favour of the merger. In such a scenario, neither the members who decide to merge, nor the ones who stay with the original party will face disqualification.
Various expert committees have recommended that rather than the Presiding Officer, the decision to disqualify a member should be made by the President (in case of MPs) or the Governor (in case of MLAs) on the advice of the Election Commission.[4] This would be similar to the process followed for disqualification in case the person holds an office of profit (i.e. the person holds an office under the central or state government which carries a remuneration, and has not been excluded in a list made by the legislature).
How has the law been interpreted by the Courts while deciding on related matters?
The Supreme Court has interpreted different provisions of the law. We discuss some of these below.
The phrase ‘Voluntarily gives up his membership’ has a wider connotation than resignation
The law provides for a member to be disqualified if he ‘voluntarily gives up his membership’. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted that in the absence of a formal resignation by the member, the giving up of membership can be inferred by his conduct.[5] In other judgments, members who have publicly expressed opposition to their party or support for another party were deemed to have resigned.[6]
In the case of the two JD(U) MPs who were disqualified from Rajya Sabha on Monday, they were deemed to have ‘voluntarily given up their membership’ by engaging in anti-party activities which included criticizing the party on public forums on multiple occasions, and attending rallies organised by opposition parties in Bihar.[7]
Decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review
The law initially stated that the decision of the Presiding Officer is not subject to judicial review. This condition was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1992, thereby allowing appeals against the Presiding Officer’s decision in the High Court and Supreme Court.[8] However, it held that there may not be any judicial intervention until the Presiding Officer gives his order.
In 2015, the Hyderabad High Court, refused to intervene after hearing a petition which alleged that there had been delay by the Telangana Assembly Speaker in acting against a member under the anti-defection law.[9]
Is there a time limit within which the Presiding Officer has to decide?
The law does not specify a time-period for the Presiding Officer to decide on a disqualification plea. Given that courts can intervene only after the Presiding Officer has decided on the matter, the petitioner seeking disqualification has no option but to wait for this decision to be made.
There have been several cases where the Courts have expressed concern about the unnecessary delay in deciding such petitions.[10] In some cases this delay in decision making has resulted in members, who have defected from their parties, continuing to be members of the House. There have also been instances where opposition members have been appointed ministers in the government while still retaining the membership of their original parties in the legislature.[11]
In recent years, opposition MLAs in some states, such as Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, have broken away in small groups gradually to join the ruling party. In some of these cases, more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party.
In these scenarios, the MLAs were subject to disqualification while defecting to the ruling party in smaller groups. However, it is not clear if they will still face disqualification if the Presiding Officer makes a decision after more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party. The Telangana Speaker in March 2016 allowed the merger of the TDP Legislature Party in Telangana with the ruling TRS, citing that in total, 80% of the TDP MLAs (12 out of 15) had joined the TRS at the time of taking the decision.[12]
In Andhra Pradesh, legislators of the main opposition party recently boycotted the entire 12-day assembly session. This boycott was in protest against the delay of over 18 months in action being taken against legislators of their party who have allegedly defected to the ruling party.[13] The Vice President, in his recent order disqualifying two JD(U) members stated that all such petitions should be decided by the Presiding Officers within a period of around three months.
Does the anti-defection law affect the ability of legislators to make decisions?
The anti-defection law seeks to provide a stable government by ensuring the legislators do not switch sides. However, this law also restricts a legislator from voting in line with his conscience, judgement and interests of his electorate. Such a situation impedes the oversight function of the legislature over the government, by ensuring that members vote based on the decisions taken by the party leadership, and not what their constituents would like them to vote for.
Political parties issue a direction to MPs on how to vote on most issues, irrespective of the nature of the issue. Several experts have suggested that the law should be valid only for those votes that determine the stability of the government (passage of the annual budget or no-confidence motions).[14]
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[1] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066 and http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57067.
[2] MLA Defection Politics Not New, Firstpost, March 13, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-forms-govt-in-goa-manipur-mla-defection-politics-not-new-telangana-ap-perfected-it-3331872.html.
[3] The Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend52.htm.
[4] Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdfand the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm.
[5] Ravi Naik vs Union of India, 1994, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/554446/.
[6] G.Viswanathan Vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras& Another, 1996, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093980/ and Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, 2007, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620629/ and Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[7] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[8] Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachilhu and Others, 1992, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1686885/.
[9] Sabotage of Anti-Defection Law in Telangana, 2015, https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/50/commentary/sabotage-anti-defection-law-telangana.html.
[10] Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha Vs Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors., 2012, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45034065/ and Mayawati Vs Markandeya Chand & Ors., 1998, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1801522/.
[11] Anti-Defecton Law Ignored, November 30, 2017, http://www.news18.com/news/politics/anti-defection-law-ignored-as-mlas-defect-to-tdp-trs-in-andhra-pradesh-and-telangana-1591319.htmland It’s official Minister Talasani is still a TDP Member, March 27, 2015, http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/Telangana/2015-03-27/Its-Official-Minister-Talasani-is-still-a-TDP-member/140135.
[12] Telangana Legislative Assembly Bulletin, March 10, 2016, http://www.telanganalegislature.org.in/documents/10656/19317/Assembly+Buletin.PDF/a0d4bb52-9acf-494f-80e7-3a16e3480460; 12 TDP MLAs merged with TRS, March 11, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/12-tdp-mlas-merged-with-trs/article8341018.ece.
[13] The line TD leaders dare not cross, December 4, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/the-line-td-leaders-dare-not-cross/article21257521.ece
[14] Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution, 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm, Report of the Committee on electoral reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdf and Law Commission (170th report), 1999, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm.