In India, children in the age group of 6-14 years have the right to free and compulsory elementary education in a neighbourhood school under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009. This covers primary (classes 1-5) and upper primary (classes 6-8) levels, which collectively constitute elementary education.
Amongst several provisions focused on elementary education, the Act provides for the No Detention Policy. Under this, no child will be detained till the completion of elementary education in class 8. The RTE (Second Amendment) Bill, 2017, introduced recently, revisits the No Detention Policy. In light of this, we discuss the No Detention Policy and issues affecting the implementation of RTE.
What is the No Detention Policy?
The rationale for the No Detention Policy or automatic promotion to the next class is minimising dropouts, making learning joyful, and removing the fear of failure in exams.[1] The evaluation mechanism under the Policy is the Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE) for holistic assessments (e.g., paper-pencil test, drawing and reading pictures, and expressing orally) as opposed to the traditional system of examinations. CCE does not mean no evaluation, but it means an evaluation of a different kind from the traditional system of examinations.
What does the RTE (Second Amendment) Bill, 2017 propose to do?
The Bill proposes a ‘regular examination’ which will be held in class 5 and class 8 at the end of every academic year.[2] In the event that a child fails these examinations, he will be given remedial instruction and the opportunity for a re-examination.
If he fails in the re-examination, the central or state governments may choose: (i) to not detain the child at all, or (ii) to detain the child in class 5, class 8, or in both classes. This is in contrast to the current Policy where a child cannot be detained until the completion of class 8.
Conversation around the No Detention Policy
Following the implementation of the No Detention Policy, experts have recommended rolling it back partially or fully. The reasons for this reconsideration include: (i) the lack of preparedness of the education system to support the Policy, (ii) automatic promotion disincentivising children from working hard, (iii) low accountability of teachers, (iv) low learning outcomes, and (iii) the lack of proper implementation of CCE and its integration with teacher training.1,[3],[4]
In 2015, all the states were asked to share their views on the No Detention Policy. Most of the states suggested modifications to the Policy in its current form.
What do the numbers say?
Consequent to the enactment of RTE, enrolment has been 100% at the primary level (see Figure 1). While enrolment has been universal (100%) at the primary level, low transition of students from one class to another at progressively higher levels has been noted. This has resulted in high dropouts at the secondary education level, with the highest dropout rate being 17% at the class 10 level (see Figure 2).
Figure 1: Enrolment in elementary education (2005-2014)
One of the reasons for low dropouts at the elementary level may be the obligation to automatically promote and not detain children under the No Detention Policy. However, there is no such obligation on the government to provide for the same post class 9 i.e., in secondary education. The reasons which explain the rise in dropouts at the secondary level include domestic activities for girls and economic activities for boys, reasons common to both include financial constraints and lack of interest in education.[5]
Figure 2: Dropout rates in school education (2014-15)
How does RTE ensure quality education?
Based on the high enrolment and low dropout rates in elementary education, it can be inferred that children are being retained in schools for longer. However, there have been some adverse observations regarding the learning outcomes of such children. For example, the Economic Survey 2015-16 pointed out that only about 42% of students in class 5 (in government schools) are able to read a class 2 text. This number has in fact declined from 57% in 2007.[6] The National Achievement Survey (2015) for class 5 has also revealed that performance of students, on an average, had gone down from the previous round of the survey conducted in 2014.[7]
Key reasons attributed to low learning levels are with regard to teacher training and high vacancies.7,[8],[9] Against a total of 19 lakh teacher positions sanctioned under Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan in 2011-12, only 12 lakh were filled. Further, approximately 4.5 lakh untrained teachers were operating in 19 states. Teacher training institutes such as District Institutes of Education and Training are also experiencing high vacancies with regard to trainers who train teachers.[10]
It has also been noted that the presence of contract/temporary teachers, instead of permanent teachers, contributes to the deterioration of quality of education. In fact, experts have recommended that to ensure quality secondary education, the reliance on contract/temporary teachers must be done away with. Instead, fully qualified teachers with salary and benefits must be hired.[11] It has also been recommended that teachers should not be burdened with ancillary tasks of supervising cooking and serving of mid-day meals.10
The RTE Act, 2009 sought to ensure that teachers acquire minimum qualifications for their appointment, within five years of its enactment (i.e. till March 31, 2015). Earlier this year, another Bill was introduced in Parliament to amend this provision under the Act. The Bill seeks to extend this deadline until 2019.
In sum, currently there are two Bills seeking to amend the RTE Act, which are pending in Parliament. It remains to be seen, how they impact the implementation of the Act going forward.
[1] “Report of CABE Sub Committee on Assessment on implementation of CCE and no detention provision”, 2015, Ministry of Human Resource Development, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/AssmntCCE.pdf
[2] The RTE (Second Amendment) Bill, 2017.
[3] Change in No-Detention Policy, Ministry of Human Resource Development, March 9, 2017, Press Information Bureau.
[4] Unstarred question no. 1789, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Rajya Sabha, December 1, 2016.
[5] “Key Indicators of Social Consumption in India: Education”, NSS 71st Round, 2014, http://mail.mospi.gov.in/index.php/catalog/160/related_materials
[6] Economic Survey 2015-16, Ministry of Finance, http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget2016-2017/es2014-15/echapter-vol2.pdf
[7] National Achievement Survey, Class V (Cycle 3) Subject Wise Reports, 2014, http://www.ncert.nic.in/departments/nie/esd/pdf/NationalReport_subjectwise.pdf
[8] “253rd Report: Demands for Grants 2013-14, Demand No. 57”, Department of School Education and Literacy, Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, April 26, 2013, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/253.pdf
[9] “285th Report: Action Taken Report on 250th Report on Demands for Grants 2016-17”, Department of School Education and Literacy, Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, December 16, 2016, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/285.pdf
[10] “283rd Report: The Implementation of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and Mid-Day-Meal Scheme’, Department of School Education and Literacy, Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, December 15, 2016, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/283.pdf
[11] “Report of the CABE Committee on Girls’ education and common school system”, Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2005, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/Girls%20Education.pdf
There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.
