"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries.  Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny.  These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976.  Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community.  They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject.  In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not:  “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.”  This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues.  Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight.  The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament.  The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of   the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies.  Some of these are:

  1. The entire intelligence community, including all ancillary departments and officials, should be covered by the mandate of one or more parliamentary oversight bodies.
  2. The mandate of a parliamentary oversight body might include some or all of the following (a) legality, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency, (d) budgeting and accounting; (e) conformity with relevant human rights Conventions (f) policy/administrative aspects of the intelligence services.
  3. The recommendations and reports of the parliamentary oversight body should be (a) published; (b) debated in parliament; (c) monitored with regard to its implementation by the government and intelligence community.
  4. The resources and legal powers at the disposal of the parliamentary oversight body should match the scope of its mandate.
  5. Parliament should be responsible for appointing and, where necessary, removing members of a body exercising the oversight function in its name.
  6. Representation on parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-party, preferably in accordance with the strengths of the political parties in parliament.
  7. Government ministers should be debarred from membership (and parliamentarians should be required to step down if they are appointed as ministers) or the independence of the committee will be compromised. The same applies to former members of agencies overseen.
  8. The oversight body should have the legal power to initiate investigations; Members of oversight bodies should have unrestricted access to all information which is necessary for executing their oversight tasks.
  9. The oversight body should have power to subpoena witnesses and to receive testimony under oath.
  10. The oversight body should take appropriate measures and steps in order to protect information from unauthorised disclosure.
  11. The committee should report to parliament at least yearly or as often as it deems necessary.
  12. The oversight body should have access to all relevant budget documents, provided that safeguards are in place to avoid leaking of classified information.

Petroleum Secretary S Sundareshan, while addressing a press Conference on Friday, announced the government’s decision to deregulate prices of petrol. Petrol prices shall now be subject to periodic revisions based on fluctuations in market prices. An immediate hike of Rs. 3.50 per litre has already been affected. Prices of diesel shall be deregulated in stages while those of kerosene and LPG shall continue to be regulated by the government. For the moment, diesel has been hiked by Rs. 2 per litre, kerosene by Rs. 3 per litre and LPG by Rs. 35 per cylinder. Crude to retail: Pricing and under-recoveries India imports about 80% of its crude oil requirement.  Therefore, the cost of petroleum products in India is linked to international prices. The Indian barrel of crude cost $78 in March 2010. Once crude is refined, it is ready for retail. This retail product, is then taxed by the government (both Centre and State) before it is sold to consumers. Taxes are levied primarily for two reasons: to discourage consumption and as a source of revenue. Taxes in India are in line with several developed nations, with the notable exception of the US (See Note 1) Before the current hike, taxes and duties in Delhi accounted for around 48% of the retail price of petrol and 24% of the retail price of diesel. (Click Here for details) Ideally, the retail prices of petroleum products should then be determined as: Retail prices = Cost of production + taxes + profit margins However, in practice, the government indicates the price at which PSU oil companies sell petroleum products. Since these oil companies cannot control the cost of crude (the primary driver of the cost of production) or the taxes, the net result is an effect on their profit margins. In cases where the cost of production and taxes exceeds the prescribed retail price, the profit margins become negative. These negative profit margins are called ‘under-recoveries’. When international crude prices rose above $130 in 2008, under-recoveries reached an all-time high of Rs. 103,292 crore. Even at much lower prices in 2009-10 (averaging at $70 per barrel), under-recoveries totalled Rs. 46,051 crore. (See Note 2) The latest move is an effort to reduce these under-recoveries. The government cited the recommendations of the Kirit Parkih Committee while announcing its decision (Summary - Kirit Parikh Committee report). Any alternatives to price hike? As is evident from above, under-recoveries can also be reduced by decreasing taxes. In fact, one might argue that by both taxing the product and offering a subsidy, the government is complicating the situation. Usually whenever subsidization coexists with taxation, it serves the purpose of redistribution. For example, taxes might be collected universally but subsidy be granted to the weaker sections only. However, this is not the case in the current situation. What needs to be noted here is that these taxes are a very significant source of revenue. In fact, the total taxes paid by the oil sector to the central and state governments were around 3% of GDP in 2008-09 (See Note 3). Reducing taxes now might make it difficult for successive governments to raise taxation rates on petroleum products again. Moreover, though taxes are levied both by the Centre and the States, the subsidy is borne only by the Centre. Hence, the current arrangement is beneficial to the States. Possible future scenarios The opposition has voiced concerns that the hike in prices is likely to lead to even higher inflation and will further burden the consumer. The Chief Economic Advisor to the Finance Ministry, Dr. Kaushik Basu, however, told the media that these changes would have a beneficial effect on the economy. According to him,

"The (decontrol of petrol prices), coupled with price increase for LPG (cooking gas) and kerosene, will have an immediate positive impact on inflation. I expect an increase of 0.9 percentage points in the monthly Wholesale Price Index (WPI) inflation".

 

However, he added, that since the hike in fuel prices would push down fiscal and revenue deficit,

"they will exert a downward pressure on prices… More importantly, from now on, if there is a global shortage and the international price of crude rises, this signal will be transmitted to the Indian consumer. It will rationalise the way we spend money, the kinds and amount of energy we use, and the cars we manufacture. It is an important step in making India a more efficient, global player”.

It remains to be seen how the actual situation pans out. Notes 1) Share of tax in retail price (%)

Country Petrol Diesel
France 61% 46%
Germany 63% 47%
Italy 59% 43%
Spain 52% 38%
UK 64% 57%
Japan 48% 34%
Canada 32% 25%
USA 14% 16%
India (Del) 48% 24%

Source:  Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, PRS (Data as of Feb, 2010) 2) Under-recoveries by oil companies (Rs Crore)

Year Petrol Diesel PDS Kerosene Domestic LPG Total
2004-05 150 2,154 9,480 8,362 20,146
2005-06 2,723 12,647 14,384 10,246 40,000
2006-07 2,027 18,776 17,883 10,701 49,387
2007-08 7,332 35,166 19,102 15,523 77,123
2008-09 5,181 52,286 28,225 17,600 103,292
2008-09 5,151 9,279 17,364 14,257 46,051

Source:  Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, PRS 3) Contribution to Central and State taxes by Oil Sector (2008-09)

Category Rs (crore)
Sales tax 63,349
Excise duty 60,875
Corporate tax 12,031
Customs duty 6,299
Others (Centre) 5,093
Other (State) 4,937
Profit petroleum 4,710
Dividend 4,504
Total 1,61,798

Source:  Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell