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The following piece by C V Madhukar appeared in the September,2011 issue of Governance Now magazine. The debate in Parliament in response to the recent Anna Hazare led agitation demanding a strong Lok Pal Bill was a fine hour for the institution of Parliament.  What was even more important about the debate is that it was watched by thousands of people across the country many of whom have lost faith in the ability of our MPs to coherently articulate their point of view on substantive issues. Of course, in many cases some of these impressions about our MPs are largely formed by what the media channels tend to project, and without a full appreciation of what actually happens in Parliament.  There is now a greater awareness about an important institutional mechanism called the standing committee, and other nuances about the law making process. The Lok Pal agitation brought out another important aspect of our democracy.  There are still many in India who believe that peaceful protest is a powerful way to communicate the expectations of people to the government. Our elected representatives are prepared to respond collectively when such protests are held.  There is a negotiated settlement possible between the agitating citizens and our political establishment within the broad construct of our Constitution.  All of this means that the safety valves in our democracy are still somewhat functional, despite its many shortcomings. But the way the whole Lok Pal episode has played out so far raises a number of important questions about the functioning of our political parties and our Parliamentary system.  A fundamental question is the extent to which our elected MPs are able to ‘represent’ the concerns of the people in Parliament.  It has been obvious for some time now, that corruption at various levels has been a concern for many.  For months before the showdown in August, there have been public expressions of the disenchantment of the people about this problem.  Even though several MPs would say privately that it is time for them to do something about it as elected representatives, they were unable to come together in a way to show the people that they were serious about the issue, or that they could collectively do something significant about the problem.  The government was trying in its own way to grapple with the problem, and was unable to seize the initiative, expect for a last minute effort to find a graceful way out of the immediate problem on hand. In our governance system as outlined in our Constitution, the primary and most important institution to hold the government accountable is the Parliament.  To perform this role, the Parliament has a number of institutional mechanisms that have evolved over the years.  The creation of the CAG as a Constitutional body that provides inputs to Parliament, the Public Accounts Committee in Parliament, the question hour in Parliament are some of the ways in which the government is held to account.  Clearly all of these mechanisms together are unable to adequately do the work of overseeing the government that our MPs have been tasked with.  But it is one thing for our MPs to be effective in their role holding the government to account, and a very different thing to come across collectively as being responsive to the concerns of the people. For our MPs to play their representation role more convincingly and meaningfully there are certain issues that need to be addressed.  A major concern is about how our political parties are structured, where MPs are bound by tight party discipline. In a system where the party leadership decides who gets the party ticket to contest the next election, there is a natural incentive for MPs to toe the party line, even within their party forums.  This is often at the cost of their personal conviction about certain issues, and may sometimes be against what the citizens could want their representatives to do. Add to this the party whip system, under which each MP has to vote along the party line or face the risk of losing his seat in Parliament.  And then of course, if some MP decides to take a stand on some issue, he needs to do all the research work on his own because our elected representatives have no staff with this capability.  This deadly cocktail of negative incentives, just makes it very easy for the MP to mostly just follow the party line.  If the representation function were to be taken somewhat seriously, these issues need to be addressed. The 2004 World Development Report of the World Bank was focussed on accountability.  An important idea in the report was that it was too costly and inefficient for people to vote a government in and wait till the next election to hold the government accountable by voting it out for the poor governance it provides.  That is the reason it is essential for governments and citizens to develop ways in which processes can be developed by which the government can be held accountable even during its tenure. The myriad efforts by government such as social audits, monitoring and evaluation efforts within government departments, efforts by Parliament to hold the government accountable, efforts of civil society groups, are all ways of holding the government to account.  But over and above accountability, in an age of growing aspirations and increasing transparency, our MPs must find new ways of asserting their views and those people that they seek to represent in our Parliament.  This is an age which expects our politicians to be responsive, but in a responsible way. Even as the Lok Pal Bill is being deliberated upon in the standing committee, civil society groups continue to watch how MPs will come out on this Bill.  There are plenty of other opportunities where MPs and Parliament can take the initiative, including electoral reforms, funding of elections, black money, etc.  It remains to be seen whether our MPs will lead on these issues from the front, or will choose to be led by others. This will determine whether in the perception of the public the collective stock of our MPs will rise or continue to deplete in the months ahead.

Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23.  This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand.   This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.

Overview of financial losses

For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses.  Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees.  In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues.  State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power.  These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt.  In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.

Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21.  Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards.  Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available.  The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore.   This increase has been driven by rising costs.  At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).

Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies

Details

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Average cost of supplying power (ACS)

7.4

7.7

7.6

8.6

Average revenue realised (ARR)

6.8

7.1

7.3

7.8

Per unit loss (ACS-ARR)

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.7

Total losses (in Rs crore)

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21.  Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards.  Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available.  The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity.  The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.

Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand

In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22.  Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%.  Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers.  These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.

Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.

Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand.  The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year.  It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units.   However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).

To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up.  Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22.  To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal.  The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.

Sources:  Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.

Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23.  While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector.  In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne.   This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase.  Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.   

Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.

Coal import situation going forward

In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023.   It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%.   This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24.  Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.  

image

Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.

Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances

Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues.  Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos).  Power purchase costs in these contracts  do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged.  Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks.  As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years.  In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost.  This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments.  However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt.  In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.  

Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased.  In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22.  Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore.  Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.  

Risk to state finances

Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances.  These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.  

Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2).  As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP.  Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP).  Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.    

Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years

Year

Scheme

Details

2002

Bailout Package

States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs

2012

Financial Restructuring Package

States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore

2015

Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY)

States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses

2020

Liquidity Infusion Scheme

Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee

2022

Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme

Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure

Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.

For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here.  For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.  
 

ANNEXURE

Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)

Details

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Average cost of supplying power (ACS)

7.4

7.7

7.6

8.6

    of which

       

    Cost of procuring power 

5.8

5.9

5.8

6.6

Average revenue realised (ARR)

6.8

7.1

7.3

7.8

    of which

       

    Revenue from sale of power

5.0

4.9

5.1

5.5

    Tariff subsidy

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.5

       Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY

0.3

0.1

0.0

0.2

Per unit loss

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.7

Total financial losses

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)

State/UT

2017-18

2018-19

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

-605

-645

-678

-757

-86

-76

Andhra Pradesh

-546

-16,831

1,103

-6,894

-2,595

1,211

Arunachal Pradesh

-429

-420

NA

NA

NA

NA

Assam

-259

311

1,141

-107

357

-800

Bihar

-1,872

-1,845

-2,913

-2,966

-2,546

-10

Chandigarh

321

131

59

79

-101

NA

Chhattisgarh

-739

-814

-571

-713

-807

-1,015

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu

312

-149

-125

NA

NA

NA

Delhi

NA

NA

NA

98

57

-141

Goa

26

-121

-276

78

117

69

Gujarat

426

184

314

429

371

147

Haryana

412

281

331

637

849

975

Himachal Pradesh

-44

132

43

-153

-141

-1,340

Jharkhand

-212

-730

-1,111

-2,556

-1,721

-3,545

Karnataka

-2,439

-4,889

-2,501

-5,382

4,719

-2,414

Kerala

-784

-135

-270

-483

98

-1,022

Ladakh

NA

NA

NA

NA

-11

-57

Lakshadweep

-98

-120

-115

-117

NA

NA

Madhya Pradesh

-5,802

-9,713

-5,034

-9,884

-2,354

1,842

Maharashtra

-3,927

2,549

-5,011

-7,129

-1,147

-19,846

Manipur

-8

-42

-15

-15

-22

-146

Meghalaya

-287

-202

-443

-101

-157

-193

Mizoram

87

-260

-291

-115

-59

-158

Nagaland

-62

-94

-477

-17

24

33

Puducherry

5

-39

-306

-23

84

-131

Punjab

-2,760

363

-975

49

1,680

-1,375

Rajasthan

-11,314

-12,524

-12,277

-5,994

2,374

-2,024

Sikkim

-29

-3

-179

-34

NA

71

Tamil Nadu

-12,541

-17,186

-16,528

-13,066

-9,130

-9,192

Telangana

-6,697

-9,525

-6,966

-6,686

-831

-11,103

Tripura

28

38

-104

-4

-127

-193

Uttar Pradesh

-5,269

-5,902

-3,866

-10,660

-6,498

-15,512

Uttarakhand

-229

-808

-323

-152

-21

-1,224

West Bengal

-871

-1,171

-1,867

-4,261

1,045

-1,663

State Sector

-56,206

-80,179

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu

NA

NA

NA 

242

148

104

Delhi

109

657

-975

1,876

521

-76

Gujarat 

574

307

612

655

522

627

Odisha 

NA

NA

-842

-853

940

746

Maharashtra 

NA

590

1,696

-375

360

42

Uttar Pradesh 

182

126

172

333

256

212

West Bengal 

658

377

379

398

66

-12

Private Sector

1,523

2,057

1,042

2,276

2,813

1,643

All-India

-54,683

-78,122

-59,189

-77,896

 -13,766 

 -67,189 

Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards. 
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.