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The 15th Lok Sabha is close to the end of its tenure. A key legislation that proposes major reforms in food security was listed for discussion in Parliament. The National Food Security Bill, 2011 has been scrutinised by a Standing Committee. In January, we compared the Standing Committee's recommendations with the provisions of the Bill. Since then, amendments to the Bill have been introduced in Parliament. Debates on the Bill have revolved around the method of delivering food security, the identification of beneficiaries and the financial implications of the Bill. Method of delivery The Bill aims to make the right to food a statutory right. It proposes to use the existing Public Distribution System (PDS) to deliver foodgrain to 75% of the rural and 50% of the urban population. However, the Bill also allows for cash transfers and food coupons in lieu of grains as mechanisms to deliver food security. While the PDS is known to suffer from leakages as high as 40%, cash transfers and food coupons are known to expose recipients to volatility and price inflation. Each method of delivery would have its own implications, financial and otherwise.  The table below compares these methods of delivery.[i] [table id=7 /]

Identification The Bill does not universalise food entitlements. It classifies the population into two categories of beneficiaries, who shall be identified by the centre and states. Mechanisms that aim to target benefits to certain sections of the population have been prone to large inclusion and exclusion errors. A 2009 expert group study headed by N.C. Saxena that evaluated PDS, estimated that about 61% of the eligible population was excluded from the BPL list while 25% of APL households were included in the BPL list. Beneficiaries under the Food Security Bill will be identified through a similar process. It is unclear how these errors in identification of beneficiaries under the PDS will be addressed by the Bill. Financial implications - cost sharing between the centre and states A Bill that aims to deliver food security to a large section of the country would have significant financial implications. Costs shall be shared between the centre and states. Costs imposed on states (partial or full) include: nutritional support to pregnant women and lactating mothers, mid-day meals, anganwadi infrastructure, meals for children suffering from malnutrition, transport and delivery of foodgrains, creating and maintaining storage facilities, and costs associated with District Grievance Redressal Officers and State Food Commissions.  Although the centre shall provide some assistance, states will have to bear a significant financial burden on account of implementation. It is unclear whether Parliament can require states to allocate funds without encroaching on the powers of state legislative assemblies. If a state chooses not to allocate the necessary funds or does not possess the funds to do so, implementation of the Bill could be seriously affected. The Standing Committee examining the Bill had recommended that an independent body, such as the Finance Commission, should be consulted regarding additional funds to be borne by states. The Right to Education Act with similar centre-state sharing of funds provides for such a consultation with the Finance Commission. Cost of implementation of the Bill Another contentious issue is the cost of implementing the Bill. The Bill estimates the cost at Rs 95,000 crore. However, experts have made varying estimates on the costs ranging from Rs 2 lakh crore to Rs 3.5 lakh crore. Ashok Gulati, Chairman of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, estimated the cost at 2 lakh crore per year whereas the Minister of Food, K.V. Thomas was reported to have estimated the cost at Rs 3.5 lakh crore. The passage of the food security Bill in Parliament will depend on the ability of the government to build consensus on these issues. It remains to be seen how the Bill is debated next Parliament session.  


[i] Kapur D., Mukhopadhyay P., and A.  Subramanian.  “The Case for Direct Cash Transfers to the Poor.” Economic and Political Weekly. Vol 43, No 15 (Apr 12-18, 2008). Khera, R. “Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and Explanations.” Economic and Political Weekly. Vol XLVI, Nos 44 & 45 (Nov 5, 2011). Shah, M. “Direct Cash Transfers: No Magic Bullet.” Economic and Political Weekly. Vol 43, No 34, pp. 77-79 (Aug 23-29, 2008).

Recently, the government issued letters de-allocating coal blocks of various companies, based on the recommendations of the  Inter Ministerial Group (IMG).  This post discusses the history behind the de-allocations, the parameters the IMG used while examining the progress of various coal blocks and the action that has been taken by the government. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) released a performance audit report on 'Allocation of Coal Blocks and Augmentation of Coal Production' on August 17, 2012.  Some of the key findings of the Report were:

  • The government failed to conduct competitive bids for the allocation of coal blocks.  This resulted in a benefit of  Rs 1.86 lakh crore (approx.) to private allottees.  The government could have tapped some of this financial benefit by expediting the decision on competitive bidding for allocation of coal blocks.
  • The implementation schedule of a number of coal blocks has been delayed by one to ten years.  This schedule relates to the time frame within which the Mining Plan for the block has to be approved, various clearances have to be submitted, land acquired, etc.
  • From 2005, the Ministry of Coal (MoC) required the allottees to provide bank guarantees which would be encashed if they failed to meet the above mentioned milestones.  The CAG observed that there was a delay in introducing the bank guarantee and linking it with milestones.

The IMG on Coal was constituted for the periodic review of the development of coal blocks and end use plants.  The IMG had requested a status paper from the Coal Controller, MoC.  This has been submitted to the IMG but is not available.  The IMG will decide if private allottees have made substantial progress based on certain parameters.  The parameters used by IMG are:  approval of Mining Plan, status of environment and forest clearance, grant of mining lease and progress made in land acquisition. They are also examining the physical status of End Use Plant (EUP), investment made and the expected date of opening of the mine and commissioning of EUP. The IMG has made the following recommendations:

  • The coal blocks of companies that have not made substantial progress should be de-allocated.  Additionally, they have recommended the deduction of bank guarantee in the cases where the private companies have not reached the milestones as per the time line decided upon.  As of November 22, 2012, the IMG has recommended the de-allocation of the coal blocks listed in Table 1 and the deduction of bank guarantees for the coal blocks in Table 2.
  • Since, the system of bank guarantee was only introduced in March 2005, not all coal blocks had submitted a bank guarantee.  Where a bank guarantee has not been provided but there is substantial progress in meeting the milestones, the IMG may require the allottee to submit a bank guarantee.

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Of the coal blocks that the IMG has recommended for de-allocation, until now the government has accepted the de-allocation of the following: Bramhadih block, Gourangdih, New Patrapara, Chinora block, Warora (Southern Part) block, Lalgarh (North) block, Bhaskarpara block, Dahegaon/Makardhokra-IV block, Gondkhari block and Ramanwara North block.  The government has accepted the deduction of bank guarantees for blocks such as Moitra, Jitpur, Bhaskarpara, Durgapur II/Sariya, Dahegaon/Makardhokra-IV, Marki Mangli II, III and IV, Gondhkari, Lohari, Radhikapur East, Bijahan and Nerad Malegaon. The letters issued by the government de-allocating coal blocks and deducting bank guarantees are available here.

For a detailed summary of the CAG Report, click here.