Our Constitution provides protection against laws imposing criminal liability for actions committed prior to the enactment of the law. Article 20 (1) under the Part III (Fundamental Rights), reads: 20. (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. Thus, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on an offender cannot exceed those specified by the laws at the time. In the context of the Bhopal Gas tragedy in 1984, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was the only relevant law specifying criminal liability for such incidents. The CBI, acting on behalf of the victims, filed charges against the accused under section 304 of the IPC (See Note 1). Section 304 deals with punishment for culpable homicide and requires intention of causing death. By a judgment dated September 13, 1996, the Supreme Court held that there was no material to show that “any of the accused had a knowledge that by operating the plant on that fateful night whereat such dangerous and highly volatile substance like MIC was stored they had the knowledge that by this very act itself they were likely to cause death of any human being.” The Supreme Court thus directed that the charges be re-framed under section 304A of the IPC (See Note 2). Section 304A deals with causing death by negligence and prescribes a maximum punishment of two years along with a fine. Consequently, the criminal liability of the accused lay outlined by section 304A of the IPC and they were tried accordingly. Civil liability, on the other hand, was adjudged by the Courts and allocated to the victims by way of monetary compensation. Soon after the Bhopal Gas tragedy, the Government proposed and passed a series of laws regulating the environment, prescribing safeguards and specifying penalties. These laws, among other things, filled the legislative lacunae that existed at the time of the incident. Given the current provisions (See Note 3), a Bhopal like incident will be tried in the National Green Tribunal (once operationalized) and most likely, under the provisions of the the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The criminal liability provisions of the Act (See Note 4) prescribe a maximum penalty of five years along with a fine of one lakh rupees. Further, if an offence is committed by a company, every person directly in charge and responsible will be deemed guilty, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such an offence.

The civil liability will continue to be adjudged by the Courts and in proportion to the extent of damage unless specified separately by an Act of Parliament.

Notes 1) IPC, Section 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 2) IPC, Section 304A. Causing death by negligence Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 3) Major laws passed since 1984: 1986 - The Environment (Protection) Act authorized the central government to take measures to protect and improve environmental quality, set standards and inspect industrial units. It also laid down penalties for contravention of its provisions. 1991 - The Public Liability Insurance Act provided for public liability - insurance for the purpose of providing immediate relief to the persons affected by an accident while handling hazardous substances. 1997 - The National Environment Appellate Authority Act established to an appellate authority to hear appeals with respect to restriction of areas in which any industries, operations or processes are disallowed, subject to safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. 2009 - The National Green Tribunal Act, yet to be notified, provides for the establishment of a tribunal for expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and for giving relief and compensation for damages to persons and property. This Act also repeals the National Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997. 4) Criminal liability provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 Section 15. Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act (1) Whoever fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules made or orders or directions issued thereunder, shall, in respect of each such failure or contravention, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both, and in case the failure or contravention continues, with additional fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for every day during which such failure or contravention continues after the conviction for the first such failure or contravention. (2) If the failure or contravention referred to in sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Section 16. Offences by Companies (1) Where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

Recently, there have been multiple Naxal attacks on CRPF personnel in Chhattisgarh.  Parliamentary Committees have previously examined the working of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).  In this context, we examine issues related to functioning of these Forces and recommendations made to address them.

What is the role of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs)?

Under the Constitution, police and public order are state subjects.  However, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) assists state governments by providing them support of the Central Armed Police Forces.  The Ministry maintains seven CAPFs: (i) the Central Reserve Police Force, which assists in internal security and counterinsurgency, (ii) the Central Industrial Security Force, which protects vital installations (like airports) and public sector undertakings, (iii) the National Security Guards, which is a special counterterrorism force, and (iv) four border guarding forces, which are the Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, and Assam Rifles.

What is the sanctioned strength of CAPFs personnel compared to the actual strength?

As of January 2017, the sanctioned strength of the seven CAPFs was 10,78,514 personnel.  However, 15% of these posts (1,58,591 posts) were lying vacant.  Data from the Bureau of Police Research and Development shows that vacancies in the CAPFs have remained over the years.  Table 1 shows the level of vacancies in the seven CAPFs between 2012 and 2017. Nov 2The level of vacancies is different for various police forces.  For example, in 2017, the Sashastra Seema Bal had the highest level of vacancies at 57%.  On the other hand, the Border Security Force had 2% vacancies.  The Central Reserve Police Force, which account for 30% of the sanctioned strength of the seven CAPFs, had a vacancy of 8%.

How often are CAPFs deployed?

According to the Estimates Committee of Parliament, the number of deployment of CAPFs battalions has increased from 91 in 2012-13 to 119 in 2016-17.  The Committee has noted that there has been heavy dependence by states on central police forces even for day-to-day law and order issues.  This is likely to affect anti-insurgency and border-guarding operations of the Forces, as well as curtail their time for training.  The continuous deployment also leaves less time for rest and recuperation.

The Estimates Committee recommended that states must develop their own systems, and augment their police forces by providing adequate training and equipment.  It further recommended that the central government should supplement the efforts of state governments by providing financial assistance and other help for capacity building of their forces.

What is the financial allocation to CAPFs?

Under the Union Budget 2018-19, an allocation of Rs 62,741 crore was made to the seven CAPFs.  Of this, 32% (Rs 20,268 crore) has been allocated to the Central Reserve Police Forces.  The Estimates Committee has pointed out that most of the expenditure of the CAPFs was on salaries.  According to the Committee, the financial performance in case of outlays allocated for capacity augmentation has been very poor.  For example, under the Modernization Plan-II, Rs 11,009 crore was approved for the period 2012-17.  However, the allocation during the period 2013-16 was Rs 251 crore and the reported expenditure was Rs 198 crore.

What are the working conditions for CAPFs personnel?

The Standing Committee on Home Affairs in the year 2017 had expressed concern over the working conditions of personnel of the border guarding forces (Border Security Force, Assam Rifles, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Sashastra Seema Bal).  The Committee observed that they had to work 16-18 hours a day, with little time for rest or sleep.  The personnel were also not satisfied with medical facilities that had been provided at border locations.

In addition, the Standing Committee observed that personnel of the CAPFs have not been treated at par with the Armed Forces, in terms of pay and allowances.  The demand for Paramilitary Service Pay, similar to Military Service Pay, had not been agreed to by the Seventh Central Pay Commission.  Further, the Committee observed that the hard-area allowance for personnel of the border guarding forces was much lower as compared to members of the Armed Forces, despite being posted in areas with difficult terrain and harsh weather.

What is the status of training facilities and infrastructure available to CAPFs?

The Estimates Committee has noted that all CAPFs have set up training institutions to meet their training requirements and impart professional skills on specialised topics.  However, the Committee noted that there is an urgent need to upgrade the curriculum and infrastructure in these training institutes.  It recommended that while purchasing the latest equipment, training needs should also be taken care of, and if required, should be included in the purchase agreement itself.  Further, it recommended that the contents of training should be a mix of conventional matters as well as latest technologies such as IT, and cyber security.

According to the Estimates Committee, the MHA has been making efforts to provide modern arms, ammunition, and vehicles to the CAPFs.  In this regard, the Modernization Plan-II, for the period 2012-17, was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security.  The Plan aims to provide financial support to CAPFs for modernisation in areas of arms, clothing, and equipment.

However, the Committee observed that the procurement process under the Plan was cumbersome and time consuming.  It recommended that the bottlenecks in procurement should be identified and corrective action should be taken.  It further suggested that the MHA and CAPFs should hold negotiations with ordnance factories and manufacturers in the public or private sector, to ensure an uninterrupted supply of equipment and other infrastructure.