The implementation of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 has run into rough weather. The Act consolidates eight laws[1] governing the food sector and establishes the Food Safety and Standards Authority (FSSA) as the regulator. It requires all food business operators (including small businesses and street vendors) to obtain a licence or registration. The Regulations under FSSA related to procedure for obtaining a licence or registration was notified on August 1, 2011. According to the Regulations, all food business operators had to get a licence or registration within one year of the notification. Due to opposition from several food business operators (see here and here), the FSSA has now extended the deadline for getting a licence or registration by another six months (till February 2013). However, some of the key concerns regarding the law have not yet been addressed.
Key issues related to the Bill raised by PRS (for more details see Legislative Brief)
Other issues referred to in the media
[1]. (a) The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. (b) The Fruit Products Order, 1955. (c) The Meat Food Products Order, 1973. (d) The Vegetable Oil Products (Control) Order, 1947. (e) The Edible Oils Packaging (Regulation) Order, 1998. (f) The Solvent Extracted Oil, De oiled Meal, and Edible Flour (Control) Order, 1967. (g) The Milk and Milk Products Order, 1992. (h) Any other order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, relating to food.
The last few months saw a number of allegations of corruption in issues such as contracts for the Commonwealth Games, allocation of 2G Spectrum, and the building of the Adarsh housing society. Professor Kaushik Basu, the Chief Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, has proposed a modification in order to make the anti-corruption law in the country more effective. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 penalizes both bribe giving and taking. Bribe giving is punishable under the Act with imprisonment ranging between six months to five years. He argues that bribe giving should be legalized. Professor Basu distinguishes “harassment bribes”, which he defines as “bribes that people often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to” from the remaining, “Non-Harassment Bribes” which would involve illegal benefits accruing to the bribe giver at a potential cost to the public interest. He argues that legalization of harassment bribes would reduce the nexus between the giver (victim) and the taker of a bribe. Giving complete immunity to the bribe-giver would ensure higher reporting and co-operation of the giver in bringing to justice the bribe taker. The present law acts as a deterrent to reporting of bribery. Courts have also highlighted this issue. The High Court of Delhi in the Bharadwaaj Media Case (2007) observed that a “bribe giver is normally on the mercy of the officials and babus who compel him to pay bribe even for lawful work.” The Court further observed that “Instead of expressing gratefulness to the persons who expose corruption, if the institutions start taking action against those who expose corruption, corruption is bound to progress day and night.” It can be inferred from the judgement that steps ought to be taken to provide protection to those exposing bribery. The proposed legalization of bribe-giving may result in increased reporting of bribery and co-operation of the victim during prosecution. The fear that a bribe giver may report the public official could reduce corruption, at least in terms of harassment bribes. However, this proposal may reduce the stigma attached to bribe-giving and result in corrosion of morality. Much of the recent debate around corruption and the Lok Pal Bill revolve around effective prosecution. This paper looks at the incentive structure for reporting bribe-giving, and merits public debate.
