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To mitigate the spread of coronavirus in India, the central government imposed a nation-wide lockdown on March 25, 2020. The lockdown necessitated the suspension of all economic activities, except the ones classified as ‘essential’ from time to time, and the ones that can be carried out from home. As a result, all economic activities which require persons to travel or work outside home, such as manufacturing of non-essential goods and construction, have stopped since then. While this has resulted in a loss of income for many individuals and businesses, the ongoing 40-day lockdown is also going to severely impact the revenue of the central and state governments, primarily the tax revenue that they would have generated from all such economic activities.
This note discusses the possible effect of the lockdown on the revenue of the central and state governments in 2020-21. At this stage, the effect of the pandemic and the lockdown are difficult to estimate. We do not know whether there will be partial restrictions when the current lockdown ends on 3rd May or the possibility of further action during the year. Therefore, this note can be used as a first estimate to compute the impact under various scenarios. For example, a reader who believes that the effect on GDP growth would be different than the IMF’s estimate used below can extrapolate the numbers to fit his assumptions.
The central government and most of the state governments passed their budget for the financial year 2020-21 during February-March 2020, before the lockdown. The central government estimated a 10% growth in the country’s nominal GDP in 2020-21, and more than half of the states estimate their nominal GSDP growth rate in the range of 8%-13%. Due to the unforeseen impact of the lockdown on the economy, the 2020-21 GDP growth rates are expected to be lower than these estimates. As a result, the tax revenue that the central and state governments will be able to generate are expected to be much lower than the budgeted estimates, during the period of lockdown.
Centre’s revenue
Table 1 shows the revenue expected by the central government from various sources in 2020-21. 73% of the revenue (Rs 16.36 lakh crore) is expected to come through taxes. Because of the impact of lockdown, the actual tax revenue realised at the end of the year could be much lower, depending on how much the nominal GDP growth in 2020-21 gets affected. To estimate the impact on tax revenue, we assume that the tax-GDP ratio (i.e. an estimate of the tax generated out of each unit of economic activity) in 2020-21 will remain the same as the budget estimate. This may be a conservative estimate of loss of revenue due to lockdown as many permitted activities such as agriculture, government services and essential services have zero or lower-than-average taxes.
Based on this assumption, a 1%-point fall in the nominal GDP growth rate could decrease centre’s net tax revenue by about Rs 15,000 crore in 2020-21, i.e. 0.7% of its total revenue. The IMF has projected GDP growth for 2020-21 at 1.9%; given the inflation target of 4%, nominal GDP growth could be about 6%. In that scenario where the nominal GDP growth falls by 4% point from 10% to 6% in 2020-21, net tax revenue loss could be about Rs 60,000 crore (2.7% of total revenue). As mentioned above, the tax-GDP ratio would likely be lower than the budget estimate because of the type of activities permitted during the lockdown. This would increase the adverse impact on tax revenue.
There is a further assumption being made above regarding tax-GDP. While GST tends to move with overall GDP, direct taxes would depend on income growth of individuals and profit growth of companies. In a lower GDP growth environment, the effect on these two items may be higher than the deceleration of nominal GDP, bringing down the tax-GDP ratio. Further, customs duties depend on the value of imports, which may have a lower growth. This would, to some extent, be mitigated by the increase in the rate of excise duty on petroleum products.
These computations have been made considering the 2019-20 revised estimate as the base and the 2020-21 budget estimate as being realistic when it was made. However, these numbers may also be lower. For instance, if we extrapolate the net tax revenue growth rate of April 2019 to February 2020 (as released by the Controller General of Accounts) to March 2020, the shortfall is of the order of Rs 1,62,000 crore or 11% of the revised estimate. Thus, the shortfall in tax collections in 2020-21 may be significantly higher.
Table 1: Central government's revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
Source |
Revenue |
Share in Total Revenue |
Net Tax Revenue |
16,35,909 |
73% |
Non-Tax Revenue |
3,85,017 |
17% |
Dividends and Profits |
1,55,395 |
6.9% |
Capital Receipts |
2,24,967 |
10% |
Disinvestment |
2,10,000 |
9.4% |
Total Revenue |
22,45,893 |
- |
Note: Capital receipts and total revenue do not include borrowings.
Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.
Other than taxes, the centre’s receipts consist of non-tax revenue and capital receipts. A significant part of non-tax revenue is from dividends and profits of public sector enterprises (PSEs) and the RBI (Rs 1.55 lakh crore). If profitability gets impacted, then there could be an adverse impact in these figures. The major chunk of capital receipts is budgeted from disinvestment of PSEs (Rs 2.1 lakh crore). Equity markets have declined sharply over the last month. If equity markets remain volatile, the disinvestment process and consequently the disinvestment receipts could get affected. Note that disinvestment receipts were targeted at Rs 2,10,000 crore, significantly higher than the Rs 50,299 crore raised in 2019-20.
Devolution to States
Like the centre, states also rely on taxes for most of their revenue. As per their 2020-21 budget, on an average, nearly 70% of their revenue is estimated to come from taxes (45% from their own taxes and 25% from their share of centre’s taxes). Lower collections in centre’s taxes because of the lockdown will also impact states’ share in them (also known as devolution). Table 2 shows the share of states in centre’s tax revenue and how they could get impacted by a lower economic growth rate due to the lockdown.
Table 2: Impact of lower economic growth during the lockdown on devolution in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
Share in divisible pool (%) |
Devolution |
Impact of 1% point drop in national nominal GDP growth rate on Devolution |
Revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
4.11 |
32,238* |
293 |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
1.76 |
13,802 |
125 |
0.61% |
Assam |
3.13 |
26,776 |
243 |
0.26% |
Bihar |
10.06 |
91,181 |
829 |
0.45% |
Chhattisgarh |
3.42 |
26,803 |
244 |
0.29% |
Delhi |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Goa |
0.39 |
3,027 |
28 |
0.21% |
Gujarat |
3.4 |
26,646 |
242 |
0.15% |
Haryana |
1.08 |
8,485 |
77 |
0.09% |
Himachal Pradesh |
0.8 |
6,266 |
57 |
0.15% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
- |
15,200 |
138 |
0.16% |
Jharkhand |
3.31 |
25,980 |
236 |
0.31% |
Karnataka |
3.65 |
28,591 |
260 |
0.14% |
Kerala |
1.94 |
20,935 |
190 |
0.17% |
Madhya Pradesh |
7.89 |
61,841* |
562 |
NA |
Maharashtra |
6.14 |
48,109 |
437 |
0.13% |
Manipur |
0.72 |
5,630 |
51 |
0.28% |
Meghalaya |
0.77 |
5,999* |
55 |
NA |
Mizoram |
0.51 |
3,968 |
36 |
0.37% |
Nagaland |
0.57 |
4,493 |
41 |
0.28% |
Odisha |
4.63 |
36,300 |
330 |
0.27% |
Punjab |
1.79 |
14,021 |
127 |
0.14% |
Rajasthan |
5.98 |
46,886 |
426 |
0.25% |
Sikkim |
0.39 |
3,043 |
28 |
0.35% |
Tamil Nadu |
4.19 |
32,849 |
299 |
0.14% |
Telangana |
2.13 |
16,727 |
152 |
0.11% |
Tripura |
0.71 |
5,560 |
51 |
0.30% |
Uttar Pradesh |
17.93 |
1,52,863 |
1,389 |
0.33% |
Uttarakhand |
1.1 |
8,657 |
79 |
0.19% |
West Bengal |
7.52 |
65,835 |
598 |
0.33% |
Total |
100 |
8,38,710 |
7,624 |
0.22% |
Note: *Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so their devolution data has been computed as the total devolution to states provided in the union budget multiplied by their share. The devolution data for all other states has been taken from the state budget documents, which may not match with the union budget data in case of a few states. Revenue receipts data not available for Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya. The total for revenue receipt share has been computed excluding these three states.
Sources: Union and State Budget Documents; 15th Finance Commission Report for 2020-21; PRS.
State GST
Out of the 45% revenue coming from state’s own taxes, 35% revenue is estimated to come from three taxes – state GST (19%), sales tax/ VAT (10%), and state excise (6%). State GST is levied on the consumption of most goods and services within the state. While state GST is the largest component of states’ own tax revenue, states do not have the autonomy to change tax rates on their own as the rates are decided by the GST Council. Thus, due to lower GST revenue during the lockdown period, if a state wishes to increase GST rates for the remaining part of the year, it cannot do this on its own.
Table 3 shows the possible impact of a 1%-point decrease in the growth rates of nominal GSDP (GDP of the state) and its impact on state GST revenue in the year 2020-21. These estimates are based on the assumption that the tax-GSDP ratio during the lockdown remains same as estimated for the 2020-21 budget. However, as discussed earlier, the tax-GDP ratio for taxes such as GST is likely to decline. The analysis estimates the minimum impact on states’ GST revenue and does not captures its full extent.
Table 3: Impact of lower GSDP growth during the lockdown on state GST revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
State GST revenue |
Impact of 1% point drop in nominal GSDP growth rate on State GST revenue |
Revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
324 |
3 |
0.01% |
Assam |
13,935 |
128 |
0.14% |
Bihar |
20,800 |
187 |
0.10% |
Chhattisgarh |
10,701 |
97 |
0.12% |
Delhi |
23,800 |
215 |
0.39% |
Goa |
2,772 |
26 |
0.19% |
Gujarat |
33,050 |
292 |
0.18% |
Haryana |
22,350 |
198 |
0.22% |
Himachal Pradesh |
3,855 |
35 |
0.09% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
6,065 |
55 |
0.06% |
Jharkhand |
9,450 |
85 |
0.11% |
Karnataka |
47,319 |
445 |
0.25% |
Kerala |
32,388 |
289 |
0.25% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
1,07,146 |
957 |
0.28% |
Manipur |
914 |
8 |
0.05% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
504 |
4 |
0.04% |
Nagaland |
541 |
5 |
0.04% |
Odisha |
15,469 |
139 |
0.11% |
Punjab |
15,859 |
141 |
0.16% |
Rajasthan |
28,250 |
255 |
0.15% |
Sikkim |
650 |
5 |
0.07% |
Tamil Nadu |
46,196 |
410 |
0.19% |
Telangana |
27,600 |
242 |
0.17% |
Tripura |
1,311 |
12 |
0.07% |
Uttar Pradesh |
55,673 |
525 |
0.12% |
Uttarakhand |
5,386 |
49 |
0.12% |
West Bengal |
33,153 |
298 |
0.17% |
Total |
5,65,461 |
5,104 |
0.17% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available. 2020-21 GSDP data for Delhi was not available, so the GSDP growth rate in 2020-21 has been assumed to be the same as the growth rate in 2019-20 (10.5%).
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
Sales tax/ VAT and State Excise
These two taxes have been major sources of revenue for states, estimated to contribute 16% of states’ revenue in 2020-21. With implementation of GST, states can now levy sales tax only on petroleum products (petrol, diesel, crude oil, natural gas, and aviation turbine fuel) and alcohol for human consumption. However, the lockdown has severely impacted the consumption, and thus sale, of all of these goods as most of the transportation is prohibited and businesses selling alcohol are also shut. As a result, the revenue coming from these taxes is likely to see a much larger impact as compared to the other taxes.
In addition, alcohol is also subject to state excise. Table 4 shows the average monthly impact of the lockdown on revenue from state excise. That is, this estimates the loss of revenue for each month of lockdown, with the assumption that there is no production of alcohol for human consumption during such periods.
Table 4: Average monthly impact of the lockdown on state excise revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
State excise revenue |
Average monthly impact on state excise revenue |
Monthly revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
157 |
13 |
0.06% |
Assam |
1,750 |
146 |
0.16% |
Bihar |
0 |
0 |
0.00% |
Chhattisgarh |
5,200 |
433 |
0.52% |
Delhi |
6,300 |
525 |
0.95% |
Goa |
548 |
46 |
0.34% |
Gujarat |
144 |
12 |
0.01% |
Haryana |
7,500 |
625 |
0.69% |
Himachal Pradesh |
1,788 |
149 |
0.39% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
1,450 |
121 |
0.14% |
Jharkhand |
2,301 |
192 |
0.25% |
Karnataka |
22,700 |
1,892 |
1.05% |
Kerala |
2,801 |
233 |
0.20% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
19,225 |
1,602 |
0.46% |
Manipur |
15 |
1 |
0.01% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
1 |
0 |
0.00% |
Nagaland |
6 |
0 |
0.00% |
Odisha |
5,250 |
438 |
0.35% |
Punjab |
6,250 |
521 |
0.59% |
Rajasthan |
12,500 |
1,042 |
0.60% |
Sikkim |
248 |
21 |
0.26% |
Tamil Nadu |
8,134 |
678 |
0.31% |
Telangana |
16,000 |
1,333 |
0.93% |
Tripura |
266 |
22 |
0.13% |
Uttar Pradesh |
37,500 |
3,125 |
0.74% |
Uttarakhand |
3,400 |
283 |
0.67% |
West Bengal |
12,732 |
1,061 |
0.59% |
Total |
1,74,164 |
14,514 |
0.48% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
Sales tax/VAT is collected from sale of alcohol and petroleum products. We do not have any data on the reduction of sale of these items -- news reports indicating sale of alcohol in some states while petroleum products would be used by providers of essential services. For estimating the impact on sales tax/ VAT revenue, we have assumed the following three scenarios: (i) 40% shortfall in tax collections, (ii) 60% shortfall in tax collections, and (iii) 80% shortfall in tax collections in any month of lockdown. Table 5 shows the average monthly impact of the lockdown on sales tax/ VAT revenue under the three scenarios.
Table 5: Impact of lockdown on sales tax/ VAT revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
Loss of sales tax/ VAT revenue per lockdown month |
As a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
||||
40% shortfall |
60% shortfall |
80% shortfall |
40% shortfall |
60% shortfall |
80% shortfall |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
9 |
14 |
18 |
0.04% |
0.07% |
0.09% |
Assam |
178 |
267 |
356 |
0.19% |
0.29% |
0.39% |
Bihar |
194 |
292 |
389 |
0.11% |
0.16% |
0.21% |
Chhattisgarh |
138 |
207 |
276 |
0.16% |
0.25% |
0.33% |
Delhi |
207 |
310 |
413 |
0.37% |
0.56% |
0.75% |
Goa |
41 |
62 |
83 |
0.31% |
0.47% |
0.62% |
Gujarat |
774 |
1,162 |
1,549 |
0.48% |
0.72% |
0.95% |
Haryana |
357 |
535 |
713 |
0.40% |
0.59% |
0.79% |
Himachal Pradesh |
56 |
84 |
112 |
0.15% |
0.22% |
0.29% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
50 |
75 |
100 |
0.06% |
0.09% |
0.11% |
Jharkhand |
195 |
293 |
391 |
0.26% |
0.39% |
0.52% |
Karnataka |
593 |
889 |
1,186 |
0.33% |
0.49% |
0.66% |
Kerala |
775 |
1,163 |
1,551 |
0.68% |
1.01% |
1.35% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
1,333 |
2,000 |
2,667 |
0.38% |
0.58% |
0.77% |
Manipur |
9 |
14 |
18 |
0.05% |
0.08% |
0.10% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
3 |
4 |
5 |
0.03% |
0.04% |
0.06% |
Nagaland |
9 |
13 |
18 |
0.06% |
0.09% |
0.12% |
Odisha |
292 |
438 |
583 |
0.23% |
0.35% |
0.47% |
Punjab |
186 |
279 |
372 |
0.21% |
0.32% |
0.42% |
Rajasthan |
700 |
1,050 |
1,400 |
0.40% |
0.61% |
0.81% |
Sikkim |
7 |
11 |
15 |
0.09% |
0.14% |
0.18% |
Tamil Nadu |
1,868 |
2,802 |
3,736 |
0.85% |
1.28% |
1.70% |
Telangana |
880 |
1,320 |
1,760 |
0.61% |
0.92% |
1.23% |
Tripura |
15 |
22 |
30 |
0.09% |
0.13% |
0.17% |
Uttar Pradesh |
943 |
1,414 |
1,886 |
0.22% |
0.33% |
0.45% |
Uttarakhand |
66 |
98 |
131 |
0.15% |
0.23% |
0.31% |
West Bengal |
251 |
377 |
503 |
0.14% |
0.21% |
0.28% |
Total |
10,130 |
15,195 |
20,260 |
0.34% |
0.51% |
0.67% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
How much can GST compensation help?
The shortfall in state GST revenue could get offset by the GST compensation provided to states by the central government. The GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, requires the central government to provide compensation to states for loss of revenue arising due to GST implementation until 2022. For this purpose, the Act guarantees a 14% annual growth rate in state GST revenue, which is much higher than the growth likely in the year 2020-21. As a result, the central government would be required to provide states a compensation equivalent to the shortfall in growth in their state GST revenue, in comparison to the 14% growth.
However, it is likely that there may not be sufficient funds to provide compensation to states in 2020-21. Compensation to states is given out of the GST Compensation Fund, which consists of collections of a cess levied specifically to generate funds for this purpose. The cess is levied on coal, tobacco and its products, pan masala, automobiles, and aerated drinks. The cess collections may see a shortfall as the sale of many of these goods is likely to be affected this year. Note that domestic automobile sales declined 18% in 2019-20 over the previous year while coal production stayed constant.
In the 2020-21 budget, the central government estimated to provide Rs 1,35,368 crore as compensation to states, which is close to the total compensation estimated by states in their budgets. However, due to the lockdown, the cess collections financing these grants are estimated to decrease, whereas the compensation requirement of states is estimated to increase due to lower GST collections. While there is a risk that any incremental requirement may not be met, states’ revenue can see a much larger impact if cess collections are not even sufficient to meet their existing amounts as per the 2020-21 budgets (Table 6). States, on an average, depend on GST compensation grants for 4.4% of their revenue in 2020-21. However, states such as Gujarat, Punjab, and Delhi expect almost 14-15% of their revenue in 2020-21 to come in the form of GST compensation grants.
Table 6: GST compensation grants estimated by states in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
GST Compensation |
GST compensation as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
0 |
0.0% |
Assam |
1,000 |
1.1% |
Bihar |
3,500 |
1.9% |
Chhattisgarh |
2,938 |
3.5% |
Delhi |
7,800 |
14.1% |
Goa |
1,358 |
10.2% |
Gujarat |
22,510 |
13.9% |
Haryana |
7,000 |
7.8% |
Himachal Pradesh |
3,338 |
8.7% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
3,177 |
3.6% |
Jharkhand |
1,568 |
2.1% |
Karnataka |
16,116 |
9.0% |
Kerala |
0 |
0.0% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
10,000 |
2.9% |
Manipur |
0 |
0.0% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
0 |
0.0% |
Nagaland |
0 |
0.0% |
Odisha |
6,200 |
5.0% |
Punjab |
12,975 |
14.7% |
Rajasthan |
4,800 |
2.8% |
Sikkim |
0 |
0.0% |
Tamil Nadu |
10,300 |
4.7% |
Telangana |
0 |
0.0% |
Tripura |
208 |
1.2% |
Uttar Pradesh |
7,608 |
1.8% |
Uttarakhand |
3,571 |
8.4% |
West Bengal |
4,928 |
2.7% |
Total |
1,30,894 |
4.4% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
A similar scenario played out last year when due to the economic slowdown, the cess collections were not sufficient to meet states’ compensation requirements. As a result, states have received the GST compensation only till November 2019. Note that the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 provides that the GST Council can recommend other funding mechanisms for the Compensation Fund. For instance, this can be done when there is a shortfall of money in the Fund for providing compensation to states.
Impact on State Finances
In light of such severe stress on the revenue side, states will have to either cut their budgeted expenditure or increase their borrowings to meet the budget targets. Note that because of the coronavirus pandemic and the lockdown, states are also making unforeseen expenditure in the health sector and for providing relief from the lockdown. As a result, many states have already started working on the former by drawing up plans to defer or cut their planned expenditure, or divert funds for planned expenditure towards these immediate requirements. With relatively less flexibility on the side of revenue expenditure, capital expenditure could see a larger cut in many states. For instance, revenue expenditure includes expenditure committed towards payment of interest, salaries, and pension. On average, this committed expenditure uses up 50% of states’ revenue. However, some states have already gone ahead and deferred or cut the expenditure towards payment of salaries. Also, with private consumption and investment expected to remain sluggish, reduction of government expenditure could lead to a further decline in GDP.
The other option for states is to increase their borrowings. However, states’ borrowings are limited by their FRBM laws at 3% of their GSDP (with a further 0.5% of GSDP if they fulfil some conditions). States also need the consent of the central government to borrow money. While most states had already budgeted their fiscal deficit for 2020-21 near the upper limit, it seems some states do have some fiscal space to borrow more (Table 7). However, with GSDP expected to take a hit because of the lockdown, fiscal deficit as a percentage of GSDP for all states could be higher than budgeted targets, even if they do not make any additional borrowings.
Table 7: Fiscal deficit estimates for 2020-21 as a percentage of GSDP
State/ UT |
2019-20 (Revised) |
2020-21 (Budgeted) |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
3.1% |
2.4% |
Assam |
5.7% |
2.3% |
Bihar |
9.5% |
3.0% |
Chhattisgarh |
6.4% |
3.2% |
Delhi |
-0.1% |
0.5% |
Goa |
4.7% |
5.0% |
Gujarat |
1.6% |
1.8% |
Haryana |
2.8% |
2.7% |
Himachal Pradesh |
6.4% |
4.0% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
NA |
5.0% |
Jharkhand |
2.3% |
2.1% |
Karnataka |
2.3% |
2.6% |
Kerala |
3.0% |
3.0% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
2.7% |
1.7% |
Manipur |
8.9% |
4.1% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
8.3% |
1.7% |
Nagaland |
9.0% |
4.8% |
Odisha |
3.4% |
3.0% |
Punjab |
3.0% |
2.9% |
Rajasthan |
3.2% |
3.0% |
Sikkim |
4.3% |
3.0% |
Tamil Nadu |
3.0% |
2.8% |
Telangana |
2.3% |
3.0% |
Tripura |
6.2% |
3.5% |
Uttar Pradesh |
3.0% |
3.0% |
Uttarakhand |
2.5% |
2.6% |
West Bengal |
2.6% |
2.2% |
Centre |
3.8% |
3.5% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: Union and State Budget Documents; PRS.
On Monday, December 4, the Chairman of Rajya Sabha disqualified two Members of Parliament (MPs) from the House under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (better known as the anti-defection law) for having defected from their party.[1] These members were elected on a Janata Dal (United) ticket. The Madras High Court is also hearing petitions filed by 18 MLAs who were disqualified by the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly in September 2017 under the anti-defection law. Allegations of legislators defecting in violation of the law have been made in several other states including Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Nagaland, Telangana and Uttarakhand in recent years.[2] In this context, we explain the anti-defection law.
What is the anti-defection law?
Aaya Ram Gaya Ram was a phrase that became popular in Indian politics after a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed his party thrice within the same day in 1967. The anti-defection law sought to prevent such political defections which may be due to reward of office or other similar considerations.[3]
The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution in 1985. It lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on grounds of defection by the Presiding Officer of a legislature based on a petition by any other member of the House. A legislator is deemed to have defected if he either voluntarily gives up the membership of his party or disobeys the directives of the party leadership on a vote. This implies that a legislator defying (abstaining or voting against) the party whip on any issue can lose his membership of the House. The law applies to both Parliament and state assemblies.
Are there any exceptions under the law?
Yes, legislators may change their party without the risk of disqualification in certain circumstances. The law allows a party to merge with or into another party provided that at least two-thirds of its legislators are in favour of the merger. In such a scenario, neither the members who decide to merge, nor the ones who stay with the original party will face disqualification.
Various expert committees have recommended that rather than the Presiding Officer, the decision to disqualify a member should be made by the President (in case of MPs) or the Governor (in case of MLAs) on the advice of the Election Commission.[4] This would be similar to the process followed for disqualification in case the person holds an office of profit (i.e. the person holds an office under the central or state government which carries a remuneration, and has not been excluded in a list made by the legislature).
How has the law been interpreted by the Courts while deciding on related matters?
The Supreme Court has interpreted different provisions of the law. We discuss some of these below.
The phrase ‘Voluntarily gives up his membership’ has a wider connotation than resignation
The law provides for a member to be disqualified if he ‘voluntarily gives up his membership’. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted that in the absence of a formal resignation by the member, the giving up of membership can be inferred by his conduct.[5] In other judgments, members who have publicly expressed opposition to their party or support for another party were deemed to have resigned.[6]
In the case of the two JD(U) MPs who were disqualified from Rajya Sabha on Monday, they were deemed to have ‘voluntarily given up their membership’ by engaging in anti-party activities which included criticizing the party on public forums on multiple occasions, and attending rallies organised by opposition parties in Bihar.[7]
Decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review
The law initially stated that the decision of the Presiding Officer is not subject to judicial review. This condition was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1992, thereby allowing appeals against the Presiding Officer’s decision in the High Court and Supreme Court.[8] However, it held that there may not be any judicial intervention until the Presiding Officer gives his order.
In 2015, the Hyderabad High Court, refused to intervene after hearing a petition which alleged that there had been delay by the Telangana Assembly Speaker in acting against a member under the anti-defection law.[9]
Is there a time limit within which the Presiding Officer has to decide?
The law does not specify a time-period for the Presiding Officer to decide on a disqualification plea. Given that courts can intervene only after the Presiding Officer has decided on the matter, the petitioner seeking disqualification has no option but to wait for this decision to be made.
There have been several cases where the Courts have expressed concern about the unnecessary delay in deciding such petitions.[10] In some cases this delay in decision making has resulted in members, who have defected from their parties, continuing to be members of the House. There have also been instances where opposition members have been appointed ministers in the government while still retaining the membership of their original parties in the legislature.[11]
In recent years, opposition MLAs in some states, such as Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, have broken away in small groups gradually to join the ruling party. In some of these cases, more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party.
In these scenarios, the MLAs were subject to disqualification while defecting to the ruling party in smaller groups. However, it is not clear if they will still face disqualification if the Presiding Officer makes a decision after more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party. The Telangana Speaker in March 2016 allowed the merger of the TDP Legislature Party in Telangana with the ruling TRS, citing that in total, 80% of the TDP MLAs (12 out of 15) had joined the TRS at the time of taking the decision.[12]
In Andhra Pradesh, legislators of the main opposition party recently boycotted the entire 12-day assembly session. This boycott was in protest against the delay of over 18 months in action being taken against legislators of their party who have allegedly defected to the ruling party.[13] The Vice President, in his recent order disqualifying two JD(U) members stated that all such petitions should be decided by the Presiding Officers within a period of around three months.
Does the anti-defection law affect the ability of legislators to make decisions?
The anti-defection law seeks to provide a stable government by ensuring the legislators do not switch sides. However, this law also restricts a legislator from voting in line with his conscience, judgement and interests of his electorate. Such a situation impedes the oversight function of the legislature over the government, by ensuring that members vote based on the decisions taken by the party leadership, and not what their constituents would like them to vote for.
Political parties issue a direction to MPs on how to vote on most issues, irrespective of the nature of the issue. Several experts have suggested that the law should be valid only for those votes that determine the stability of the government (passage of the annual budget or no-confidence motions).[14]
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[1] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066 and http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57067.
[2] MLA Defection Politics Not New, Firstpost, March 13, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-forms-govt-in-goa-manipur-mla-defection-politics-not-new-telangana-ap-perfected-it-3331872.html.
[3] The Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend52.htm.
[4] Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdfand the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm.
[5] Ravi Naik vs Union of India, 1994, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/554446/.
[6] G.Viswanathan Vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras& Another, 1996, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093980/ and Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, 2007, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620629/ and Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[7] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[8] Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachilhu and Others, 1992, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1686885/.
[9] Sabotage of Anti-Defection Law in Telangana, 2015, https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/50/commentary/sabotage-anti-defection-law-telangana.html.
[10] Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha Vs Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors., 2012, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45034065/ and Mayawati Vs Markandeya Chand & Ors., 1998, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1801522/.
[11] Anti-Defecton Law Ignored, November 30, 2017, http://www.news18.com/news/politics/anti-defection-law-ignored-as-mlas-defect-to-tdp-trs-in-andhra-pradesh-and-telangana-1591319.htmland It’s official Minister Talasani is still a TDP Member, March 27, 2015, http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/Telangana/2015-03-27/Its-Official-Minister-Talasani-is-still-a-TDP-member/140135.
[12] Telangana Legislative Assembly Bulletin, March 10, 2016, http://www.telanganalegislature.org.in/documents/10656/19317/Assembly+Buletin.PDF/a0d4bb52-9acf-494f-80e7-3a16e3480460; 12 TDP MLAs merged with TRS, March 11, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/12-tdp-mlas-merged-with-trs/article8341018.ece.
[13] The line TD leaders dare not cross, December 4, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/the-line-td-leaders-dare-not-cross/article21257521.ece
[14] Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution, 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm, Report of the Committee on electoral reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdf and Law Commission (170th report), 1999, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm.