Applications for the LAMP Fellowship 2025-26 will open on December 1, 2024. Sign up here to be notified when applications open.

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, all passenger trains were suspended till April 14, 2020.  However, goods services have been continuing with trains carrying essential commodities to various parts of the country.   Railways has also made railway parcel vans available for quick mass transportation for e-commerce entities and other customers including state governments to transport certain goods.   These include medical supplies, medical equipment, food, etc. in small parcel sizes.  Besides these, Railways has taken several other actions to provide help during the pandemic. 

Since the travel ban extends from March 23 till April 14, 2020 (and may extend further), it will impact Railways’ finances for both 2019-20 and 2020-21.  In this post, we discuss the situation of Railways’ finances, and what could be the potential impact of the travel ban on Railways’ revenues.  

Impact of the travel ban on Railways’ internal revenue

Railways generates internal revenue primarily from passenger and freight traffic.  In 2018-19 (latest actuals), freight and passenger traffic contributed to about 67% and 27% of the internal revenue respectively.  The remaining is earned from other miscellaneous sources such as parcel service, coaching receipts, and sale of platform tickets.  In 2020-21, Railways expects to earn 65% of its internal revenue from freight and 27% from passenger traffic.  

Passenger traffic:   In 2020-21, Railways expects to earn Rs 61,000 crore from passenger traffic, an increase of 9% over the revised estimates of 2019-20 (Rs 56,000 crore).  

As per numbers provided by the Ministry of Railways, up to February 2020, passenger revenue was approximately Rs 48,801 crore.  This is Rs 7,199 crore less than the 2019-20 revised estimates for passenger revenue, implying that this much amount will have to be generated in March 2020 to meet the revised estimate targets (13% of the year’s target).  However, the average passenger revenue in 2019-20 (for the 11 months) has been around Rs 4,432 crore.  Note that in March 2019 passenger revenue was Rs 4,440 crore.  With passenger travel completely banned since March 23, Railways will fall short of its target for passenger revenue in 2019-20.

As of now, it is unclear when travel across the country will resume to business as usual.  Some states have started extending the lockdown within their state.  In such a situation, the decline in passenger revenue could last longer than these three weeks of lockdown. 

Freight traffic:   In 2020-21, Railways expects to earn Rs 1,47,000 crore from goods traffic, an increase of 9% over the revised estimates of 2019-20 (Rs 1,34,733 crore).   

As per numbers provided by the Ministry of Railways, up to February 2020, freight revenue was approximately Rs 1,08,658 crore.  This is Rs 26,075 crore less than the 2019-20 revised estimates for freight revenue.  This implies that Rs 26,075 crore will have to be generated by freight traffic in March 2020 to meet the revised estimate targets (19% of the year’s target).   However, the average freight revenue in 2019-20 (for the 11 months) has been around Rs 10,029 crore.  Note that in March 2019, freight revenue was Rs 16,721 crore.  

While passenger traffic has been completely banned, freight traffic has been moving.  Transportation of essential goods, and operations of Railways for cargo movement, relief and evacuation and their related operational organisations has been allowed under the lockdown.  Several goods carried by Railways (coal, iron-ore, steel, petroleum products, foodgrains, fertilisers) have been declared to be essential goods.  Railways has also started operating special parcel trains (to carry essential goods, e-commerce goods, etc.) since the lockdown.  These activities will help continue the generation of freight revenue. 

However, some goods that Railways transports, such as cement which contributes to about 8% of Railways’ freight revenue, have not been classified as essential goods.  Railways has also relaxed certain charges levied on freight traffic.  It remains to be seen if Railways will be able to meet its targets for freight revenue.  

Figure 1: Share of freight volume and revenue in 2018-19 (in %)

image

Sources: Expenditure Profile, Union Budget 2020-21; PRS.  

Freight has been cross-subsidising passenger traffic; it may worsen this year

Railways ends up using profits from its freight business to provide for such losses in the passenger segment, and also to manage its overall financial situation.  Such cross-subsidisation has resulted in high freight tariffs.  With the ban on passenger travel and if the lockdown (in some form) were to continue, passenger operations will face more losses.  This may increase the cross-subsidy burden on freight.  Since Railways cannot increase freight charges any further, it is unclear how such cross-subsidisation would work. 

For example, in 2017-18, passenger and other coaching services incurred losses of Rs 37,937 crore, whereas freight operations made a profit of Rs 39,956 crore.   Almost 95% of profit earned from freight operations was utilised to compensate for the loss from passenger and other coaching services.  The total passenger revenue during this period was Rs 46,280 crore.  This implies that losses in the passenger business are about 82% of its revenue.  Therefore, in 2017-18, for every one rupee earned in its passenger business, Indian Railways ended up spending Rs 1.82.  

Railways expenditure 

While the travel ban has meant that Railways cannot run all its services, it still has to incur much of its operating expenditure.  Staff wages and pension have to be paid and these together comprise 66% of the Railways’ revenue expenditure.  Between 2015 and 2020 (budget estimate), Railways’ expenditure on salary has grown at an average annual rate of 13%.  

About 18% of the revenue expenditure is on fuel expenses, but that may see some decline due to a fall in oil prices.  Railways will also have to continue spending on maintenance, safety and depreciation as these are long-term costs that cannot be done away with.  In addition, regular maintenance of rail infrastructure will be necessary for freight operations.  

Revenue Surplus and Operating Ratio could further worsen

Railways’ surplus is calculated as the difference between its total internal revenue and its revenue expenditure (this includes working expenses and appropriation to pension and depreciation funds).  Operating Ratio is the ratio of the working expenditure (expenses arising from day-to-day operations of Railways) to the revenue earned from traffic.  Therefore, a higher ratio indicates a poorer ability to generate a surplus that can be used for capital investments such as laying new lines, or deploying more coaches.  A decline in revenue surplus affects Railways’ ability to invest in its infrastructure.  

In the last decade, Railways has struggled to generate a higher surplus.  Consequently, the Operating Ratio has consistently been higher than 90% (see Figure 2).  In 2018-19, the ratio worsened to 97.3% as compared to the estimated ratio of 92.8%.   The CAG (2019) had noted that if advances for 2018-19 were not included in receipts, the operating ratio for 2017-18 would have been 102.66%.

In 2020-21, Railways expects to generate a surplus of Rs 6,500 crore, and maintain the operating ratio at 96.2%.   With revenue generation getting affected due to the lockdown, this surplus may further decline, and the operating ratio may further worsen.  

Figure 2: Operating Ratio 

image

Note: RE – Revised Estimates, BE – Budget Estimates.
Sources:  Expenditure Profile, Union Budget 2020-21; PRS.  

Other sources of revenue

Besides its own internal resources, Railways has two other primary sources of financing: (i) budgetary support from the central government, and (ii) extra-budgetary resources (primarily borrowings but also includes institutional financing, public-private partnerships, and foreign direct investment).  

Budgetary support from central government:  The central government supports Railways to expand its network and invest in capital expenditure.  In 2020-21, the gross budgetary support from the central government is proposed at Rs 70,250 crore.  This is 3% higher than the revised estimates of 2019-20 (Rs 68,105 crore).  Note that with government revenue also getting affected due to the COVID pandemic, this amount may also change during the course of the year. 

Borrowings:  Railways mostly borrows funds through the Indian Railways Finance Corporation (IRFC).  IRFC borrows funds from the market (through taxable and tax-free bond issuances, term loans from banks and financial institutions), and then follows a leasing model to finance the rolling stock assets and project assets of Indian Railways.

In the past few years, Railways’ borrowings have increased sharply to bridge the gap between the available resources and expenditure.  Earlier, majority of the Railways’ capital expenditure used to be met from the budgetary support from central government.  In 2015-16, this trend changed with the majority of Railways’ capital expenditure being met through extra budgetary resources (EBR).   In 2020-21, Rs 83,292 crore is estimated to be raised through EBR, which is marginally higher than the revised estimates of 2019-20 (Rs 83,247 crore).  

Note that both these sources are primarily used to fund Railways’ capital expenditure.  Some part of the support from central government is used to reimburse Railways for the operating losses made on strategic lines, and for the operational cost of e-ticketing to IRCTC (Rs 2,216 crore as per budget estimates of 2020-21).  

If Railways’ revenue receipts decline this year, it may require additional support from the central government to finance its revenue expenditure, or finance it through its borrowings.  However, an increased reliance on borrowings could further exacerbate the financial situation of Railways.  In the last few years, there has been a decline in the growth of both rail-based freight and passenger traffic (see Figure 3) and this has affected Railways’ earnings from its core business.  A decline in growth of revenue will affect the transporter’s ability to pay off its debt in the future. 

Figure 3: Volume growth for freight and passenger (year-on-year)

 

Note: RE – Revised Estimates; BE – Budget Estimates. 
Sources:  Expenditure Profile, Union Budget 2020-21; PRS.  

Social service by Railways

Besides running freight trains, Railways has also been carrying out several other functions, to help deal with the pandemic.  For example, Railways’ manufacturing capacity is being harnessed to help deal with COVID-19.  Production facilities available with Railways are being used to manufacture items like PPE gear.  Railways has also been exploring how to use its existing manufacturing facilities to produce simple beds, medical trolleys, and ventilators.  Railways has also started providing bulk cooked food to needy people at places where IRCTC base kitchens are located.   The transporter also opened up its hospitals for COVID patients.  

As on April 6, 2,500 rail coaches had been converted as isolation coaches.  On average, 375 coaches are being converted in a day, across 133 locations in the country. 

Considering that railways functions as a commercial department under the central government, the question is whether Railways should bear these social costs.  The NITI Aayog (2016) had noted that there is a lack of clarity on the social and commercial objectives of Railways.  It may be argued that such services could be considered as a public good during a pandemic.  However, the question is who should bear the financial burden of providing such services?  Should it be Indian Railways, or should the central or state government provide this amount through an explicit subsidy?  

For details on the number of daily COVID cases in the country and across states, please see here.  For details on the major COVID related notifications released by the centre and the states, please see here.  For a detailed analysis of the Railways’ functioning and finances, please see here, and to understand this year’s Railways budget numbers, see here.

The issue of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the Indian banking sector has become the subject of much discussion and scrutiny. The Standing Committee on Finance recently released a report on the banking sector in India, where it observed that banks’ capacity to lend has been severely affected because of mounting NPAs. The Estimates Committee of Lok Sabha is also currently examining the performance of public sector banks with respect to their burgeoning problem of NPAs, and loan recovery mechanisms available.

Additionally, guidelines for banks released by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in February 2018 regarding timely resolution of stressed assets have come under scrutiny, with multiple cases being filed in courts against the same. In this context, we examine the recent rise of NPAs in the country, some of their underlying causes, and steps taken so far to address the issue.

What is the extent and effect of the NPA problem in India?

Banks give loans and advances to borrowers. Based on the performance of the loan, it may be categorized as: (i) a standard asset (a loan where the borrower is making regular repayments), or (ii) a non-performing asset. NPAs are loans and advances where the borrower has stopped making interest or principal repayments for over 90 days.

As of March 31, 2018, provisional estimates suggest that the total volume of gross NPAs in the economy stands at Rs 10.35 lakh crore. About 85% of these NPAs are from loans and advances of public sector banks. For instance, NPAs in the State Bank of India are worth Rs 2.23 lakh crore.

In the last few years, gross NPAs of banks (as a percentage of total loans) have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 9.3% in 2017 (Figure 1). This indicates that an increasing proportion of a bank’s assets have ceased to generate income for the bank, lowering the bank’s profitability and its ability to grant further credit.

Escalating NPAs require a bank to make higher provisions for losses in their books. The banks set aside more funds to pay for anticipated future losses; and this, along with several structural issues, leads to low profitability. Profitability of a bank is measured by its Return on Assets (RoA), which is the ratio of the bank’s net profits to its net assets. Banks have witnessed a decline in their profitability in the last few years (Figure 2), making them vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and consequently putting consumer deposits at risk.

Capture

What led to the rise in NPAs?

Some of the factors leading to the increased occurrence of NPAs are external, such as decreases in global commodity prices leading to slower exports. Some are more intrinsic to the Indian banking sector.

A lot of the loans currently classified as NPAs originated in the mid-2000s, at a time when the economy was booming and business outlook was very positive. Large corporations were granted loans for projects based on extrapolation of their recent growth and performance. With loans being available more easily than before, corporations grew highly leveraged, implying that most financing was through external borrowings rather than internal promoter equity. But as economic growth stagnated following the global financial crisis of 2008, the repayment capability of these corporations decreased. This contributed to what is now known as India’s Twin Balance Sheet problem, where both the banking sector (that gives loans) and the corporate sector (that takes and has to repay these loans) have come under financial stress.

When the project for which the loan was taken started underperforming, borrowers lost their capability of paying back the bank. The banks at this time took to the practice of ‘evergreening’, where fresh loans were given to some promoters to enable them to pay off their interest. This effectively pushed the recognition of these loans as non-performing to a later date, but did not address the root causes of their unprofitability.

Further, recently there have also been frauds of high magnitude that have contributed to rising NPAs. Although the size of frauds relative to the total volume of NPAs is relatively small, these frauds have been increasing, and there have been no instances of high profile fraudsters being penalised.

What is being done to address the problem of growing NPAs?

The measures taken to resolve and prevent NPAs can broadly be classified into two kinds – first, regulatory means of resolving NPAs per various laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code), and second, remedial measures for banks prescribed and regulated by the RBI for internal restructuring of stressed assets.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was enacted in May 2016 to provide a time-bound 180-day recovery process for insolvent accounts (where the borrowers are unable to pay their dues). Under the IBC, the creditors of these insolvent accounts, presided over by an insolvency professional, decide whether to restructure the loan, or to sell the defaulter’s assets to recover the outstanding amount. If a timely decision is not arrived at, the defaulter’s assets are liquidated. Proceedings under the IBC are adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal for personal insolvencies, and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for corporate insolvencies. 701 cases have been registered and 176 cases have been resolved as of March 2018 under the IBC.

What changed recently in the RBI’s guidelines to banks?

Over the years, the RBI has issued various guidelines aimed at the resolution of stressed assets of banks. These included introduction of certain schemes such as: (i) Strategic Debt Restructuring (which allowed banks to change the management of the defaulting company), and (ii) Joint Lenders’ Forum (where lenders evolved a resolution plan and voted on its implementation). In line with the enactment of the IBC, the RBI, through a circular in February 2018, substituted all the specific pre-existing guidelines with a simplified, generic, time-bound framework for the resolution of stressed assets.

In the revised framework which replaced the earlier schemes, the RBI put in place a strict deadline of 180 days during which a resolution plan must be implemented, failing which stressed assets must be referred to the NCLT under IBC within 15 days. The framework also introduced a provision for monitoring of one-day defaults, where incipient stress is identified and flagged immediately when repayments are overdue by a day.

Borrowers whose loans were tagged as NPAs before the release of the circular recently crossed the 180-day deadline for internal resolution by banks. Some of these borrowers, including various power producers and sugar mills, had appealed against the RBI guidelines in various High Courts. A two-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court had recently ruled in favour of the RBI’s powers to issue these guidelines, and refused to grant interim relief to power producers from being taken to the NCLT for bankruptcy. All lawsuits against the circular have currently been transferred to the Supreme Court, which has now issued an order to maintain status quo on the same. This means that these cases cannot be referred to the NCLT until the Supreme Court’s decision on the circular, although the RBI’s 180-day deadline has passed. This effectively provides interim relief to the errant borrowers who had moved to court till the next hearing of the apex court on this matter, which is scheduled for November 2018.