By Rohit & Anirudh A modified 'Modernization of State Police Forces' scheme was started by the central government in 2000-01. One of the objectives was to help police forces in meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism etc. The scheme aims to modernize police forces in terms of:

  • Mobility (including purchase of bullet proof and mine proof vehicles)
  • Weaponry
  • Communication Systems
  • Training
  • Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau
  • Equipments
  • Buildings

Under this scheme, States have been clubbed into different categories and Centre-State cost sharing is category specific. Since 2005-06, States have been categorized as category ‘A’ and ‘B’ with 100% and 75% Central funding respectively. All the North Eastern States, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim have been placed in category ‘A’ and thus, are entitled to receive 100% Central assistance for implementation of their annual approved plans. Recently, CAG decided to evaluate the working of the scheme and commissioned ‘performance audit’ reviews covering select general category and special category States. Each review covers a contiguous five year period between 2000 and 2007, but varies across selected states. For the periods under review, each state had a plan outlay (the total amount proposed to be spent in modernizing the state's police forces). However, in most cases, the actual release of funds fell significantly short of this outlay - in some cases the Centre did not contribute its share, in others the States lagged behind. For instance, in the case of Bihar, the Centre released only 56% of its share; while in the case of Rajasthan and West Bengal, the States did not release any funds at all. The graph below shows the actual releases by the Centre and the States (as percentages of their share in the proposed outlays): Further, even the funds that were released were not fully utilized. Thus, the amount finally spent fell significantly short of the initial proposal. The graph below shows the actual expenditure by State: Following are some of the other main findings from the CAG report:

Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces

Purpose for which money was sanctioned

Summary of CAG Findings

Planning

(Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.)

§ Submissions by the states to the MHA were delayed.

§ There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA.

§ In various states such as,

a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent money on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan.

b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police.

c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme.

Mobility

§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones.

§ The police response time was too long in some states.

§ To give examples from some states:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles.

b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent.

c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles.

Residential and non-residential buildings

§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy.

§ In states such as:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007).

b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan.

c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional because of shortage of manpower.

Weapons

§ Police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons.

§ Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow.

§ The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs.

b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations.

Communication

§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level.

§ Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower.

b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores.

Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau

§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure.

§ In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States.

§ In some states such as,

a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower.

b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months.

Training

§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low.

§ Training infrastructure was also inadequate.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained.

b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces.

Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS.

Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary.

Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces

Purpose for which money was sanctioned

Summary of CAG Findings

Planning

(Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.)

§ Submissions by the states to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were delayed.

§ There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA.

§ In various states such as,

a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent Rs 32 crore on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan.

b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police.

c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme.

Mobility

§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones, and no additions were made.

§ The police response time was too long in some states.

§ To give examples from some states:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles.

b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent.

c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles. 203 ambassador cars were procured, though only 55 were approved by the MHA.

Residential and non-residential buildings

§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy. Satisfaction levels with the housing provided were also very low.

§ In states such as:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007).

b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan, and only 1045 units were completed by 2006.

c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional even after spending Rs 2 crore because of shortage of manpower.

Weapons

§ It was observed that the police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons.

§ Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow.

§ The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs.

b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations.

Communication

§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level.

§ Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower.

b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores.

Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau

§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure.

§ In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States.

§ In some states such as,

a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower.

b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months.

Training

§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low.

§ Training infrastructure was also inadequate.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained.

b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces.

Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS.

Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary.

In law, the addition or deletion a single punctuation or a single word can have a major impact on the effect of that law.  One such example can be seen from the recommended changes in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010 by Parliament’s Standing Committee. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on May 7, 2010.  The Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests, which submitted its report on the Bill yesterday (August 18, 2010).  The Committee has made a number of recommendations regarding certain clauses in the Bill (See summary here).  One of these may have the effect of diluting the provision currently in the Bill.  The main recommendations pertain to:

  • Preventing the entry of private operators.
  • Allowing the government to increase the total liability for a nuclear incident by notification, but not decrease it.
  • Increasing the liability of the operator to Rs 1,500 crore from Rs 500 crore.
  • Increasing the time limit for claiming compensation to 20 years from 10 years.
  • Changing the provision giving operators a right of recourse against persons actually responsible for causing damage.

Clause 17 of the Bill which gives operators a right of recourse against those actually causing damage had been opposed as it was felt that it was not strong enough to hold suppliers liable in case the damage was caused by them.  Clause 17 gave a right of recourse under three conditions.  The exact clause is reproduced below: The operator of a nuclear installation shall have a right of recourse where — (a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing; (b) the nuclear incident has resulted from the wilful act or gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or services, or of his employee; (c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of a person done with the intent to cause nuclear damage. Under this clause, a right of recourse exists when (a) there is a contract giving such a right, or (b) the supplier acts deliberately or in a grossly negligent manner to cause nuclear damage, or (c) a person causes nuclear damage with the intent to do so.  If any of the three cases can be proved by the operator, he has a right of recourse. The Committee has stated that “Clause 17(b) gives escape route to the suppliers of nuclear materials, equipments, services of his employees as their willful act or gross negligence would be difficult to establish in a civil nuclear compensation case.” It recommended that Clause 17(b) should be modified to cover consequences “of latent or patent defect, supply of sub-standard material, defective equipment or services or from the gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or service.” The Committee also recommended another change in Clause 17.  It recommended that clause 17(a) may end with “and”. This provision may dilute the right of recourse available to operators.  The modified clause 17 would read as: The operator of a nuclear installation shall have a right of recourse where — (a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing; and, (b) the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of latent or patent defect, supply of sub-standard material, defective equipment or services or from the gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or services.; (c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of a person done with the intent to cause nuclear damage. This implies that for Clauses 17(b) or (c) to be applicable, the condition specified in clause 17(a) has to be compulsorily satisfied.  Two examples highlight the consequence of the recommended change in Clause 17(a) of the Bill:

  1. A person X deliberately commits sabotage in a nuclear plant and causes damage.  Under the Bill, the operator has recourse under Clause 17(c).  If the recommendation regarding clause 17 is accepted, the operator may also have to also prove the existence of a pre-existing contract with X in addition to clause 17(c).
  2. If a supplier supplies defective equipment, but does not have a contract in writing stating that he will be liable for damage caused by defective equipment, the operator may not have a right of recourse against the supplier under 17(b).

The effect of the changes recommended by the committee may thus dilute the provision as it exists in the Bill.  The table below compares the position in the Bill and the position as per the Standing Committee’s recommendations:

Right of recourse - The Bill gives operators a right to recourse under three conditions:  (a) if there is a clear contract; (b) if the damage is caused by someone with intent to cause damage; (c) against suppliers if damage is caused by their wilful act or negligence. In the Bill the three conditions are separated by a semi-colon.  The Committee recommended that the semi-colon in clause 17(a) should be replaced by “and”. This might imply that all three conditions mentioned need to exist for an operator to have recourse.
Right to recourse against suppliers exists in cases of “willful act or gross negligence on the part of the supplier”. (Clause 17) The Committee felt that the right of recourse against suppliers is vague.  It recommended that recourse against the supplier should be strengthened.  The supplier is liable if an incident has occurred due to (i) defects, or (ii) sub-standard material, or (iii) gross negligence of the supplier of the material, equipment or services. The variance with the Convention continues to exist.