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By Rohit & Anirudh A modified 'Modernization of State Police Forces' scheme was started by the central government in 2000-01. One of the objectives was to help police forces in meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism etc. The scheme aims to modernize police forces in terms of:
Under this scheme, States have been clubbed into different categories and Centre-State cost sharing is category specific. Since 2005-06, States have been categorized as category ‘A’ and ‘B’ with 100% and 75% Central funding respectively. All the North Eastern States, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim have been placed in category ‘A’ and thus, are entitled to receive 100% Central assistance for implementation of their annual approved plans. Recently, CAG decided to evaluate the working of the scheme and commissioned ‘performance audit’ reviews covering select general category and special category States. Each review covers a contiguous five year period between 2000 and 2007, but varies across selected states. For the periods under review, each state had a plan outlay (the total amount proposed to be spent in modernizing the state's police forces). However, in most cases, the actual release of funds fell significantly short of this outlay - in some cases the Centre did not contribute its share, in others the States lagged behind. For instance, in the case of Bihar, the Centre released only 56% of its share; while in the case of Rajasthan and West Bengal, the States did not release any funds at all. The graph below shows the actual releases by the Centre and the States (as percentages of their share in the proposed outlays): 
Further, even the funds that were released were not fully utilized. Thus, the amount finally spent fell significantly short of the initial proposal. The graph below shows the actual expenditure by State: 
Following are some of the other main findings from the CAG report:
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Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces |
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Purpose for which money was sanctioned |
Summary of CAG Findings |
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Planning (Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.) |
§ Submissions by the states to the MHA were delayed. § There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA. § In various states such as, a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent money on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan. b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police. c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme. |
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Mobility |
§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones. § The police response time was too long in some states. § To give examples from some states: a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles. b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent. c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles. |
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Residential and non-residential buildings |
§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy. § In states such as: a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007). b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan. c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional because of shortage of manpower. |
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Weapons |
§ Police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons. § Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow. § The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters. § In some states such as, a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs. b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations. |
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Communication |
§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level. § Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower. b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores. |
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Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau |
§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure. § In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States. § In some states such as, a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower. b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months. |
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Training |
§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low. § Training infrastructure was also inadequate. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained. b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces. |
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Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS. Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary. |
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Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces |
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Purpose for which money was sanctioned |
Summary of CAG Findings |
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Planning (Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.) |
§ Submissions by the states to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were delayed. § There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA. § In various states such as, a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent Rs 32 crore on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan. b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police. c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme. |
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Mobility |
§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones, and no additions were made. § The police response time was too long in some states. § To give examples from some states: a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles. b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent. c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles. 203 ambassador cars were procured, though only 55 were approved by the MHA. |
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Residential and non-residential buildings |
§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy. Satisfaction levels with the housing provided were also very low. § In states such as: a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007). b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan, and only 1045 units were completed by 2006. c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional even after spending Rs 2 crore because of shortage of manpower. |
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Weapons |
§ It was observed that the police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons. § Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow. § The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters. § In some states such as, a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs. b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations. |
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Communication |
§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level. § Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower. b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores. |
|
Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau |
§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure. § In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States. § In some states such as, a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower. b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months. |
|
Training |
§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low. § Training infrastructure was also inadequate. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained. b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces. |
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Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS. Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary. |
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The United Nations celebrates October 16 as the World Food Day every year, with an aim to spread awareness about eradicating hunger and ensuring food security for all.[1] In this context, we examine the status of food and public distribution in India, and some challenges in ensuring food security for all.
Background
In 2017-18, over Rs 1,50,000 crore, or 7.6% of the government’s total expenditure has been allocated for providing food subsidy under the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS).[2] This allocation is made to the Department of Food and Public Distribution under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs.
Food subsidy has been the largest component of the Department’s expenditure (94% in 2017-18), and has increased six-fold over the past 10 years. This subsidy is used for the implementation of the National Food Security Act, 2013 (NFSA), which provides subsidised food grains (wheat and rice) to 80 crore people in the country.[3] The NFSA seeks to ensure improved nutritional intake for people in the country.3
One of the reasons for the six-fold increase in food subsidy is the non-revision of the price at which food grains are given to beneficiaries since 2002.[4] For example, rice is given to families under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana at Rs 3/Kg since 2002, while the cost of providing this has increased from Rs 11/Kg in 2001-02 to Rs 33/Kg in 2017-18.
Provision of food subsidy
TPDS provides food security to people below the poverty line. Over the years, the expenditure on food subsidy has increased, while the ratio of people below poverty line has reduced. A similar trend can also be seen in the proportion of undernourished persons in India, which reduced from 24% in 1990 to 15% in 2014 (see Table 1). These trends may indicate that the share of people needing subsidised food has declined.
Nutritional balance: The NFSA guarantees food grains i.e. wheat and rice to beneficiaries, to ensure nutritious food intake.3 Over the last two decades, the share of cereals or food grains as a percentage of food consumption has reduced from 13% to 8% in the country, whereas that of milk, eggs, fish and meat has increased (see Figure 1). This indicates a reduced preference for wheat and rice, and a rise in preference towards other protein rich food items. 
Methods of providing food subsidy
Food subsidy is provided majorly using two methods. We discuss these in detail below.
TPDS assures beneficiaries that they will receive food grains, and insulates them against price volatility. Food grains are delivered through fair price shops in villages, which are easy to access.[5],[6]
However, high leakages have been observed in the system, both during transportation and distribution. These include pilferage and errors of inclusion and exclusion from the beneficiary list. In addition, it has also been argued that the distribution of wheat and rice may cause an imbalance in the nutritional intake as discussed earlier.7 Beneficiaries have also reported receiving poor quality food grains as part of the system.
Cash Transfers seek to increase the choices available with a beneficiary, and provide financial assistance. It has been argued that the costs of DBT may be lesser than TPDS, owing to lesser costs incurred on transport and storage. These transfers may also be undertaken electronically.6,7
However, it has also been argued that cash received as part of DBT may be spent on non-food items. Such a system may also expose beneficiaries to inflation. In this regard, one may also consider the low penetration and access to banking in rural areas.[7]
In 2017-18, 52% of the centre’s total subsidy expenditure will be on providing food subsidy under TPDS (see Figure 2). The NFSA states that the centre and states should introduce schemes for cash transfers to beneficiaries. Other experts have also suggested replacing TPDS with a Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) system.4,[8]
The central government introduced cash subsidy to TPDS beneficiaries in September 2015.[9] As of March 2016, this was being implemented on a pilot basis in a few union territories. In 2015, a Committee on Restructuring of Food Corporation of India had also recommended introducing Aadhaar to plug leakages in PDS, and indexing it to inflation. The Committee estimated that a switch to DBT would reduce the food subsidy bill of the government by more than Rs 30,000 crore.[10]
Current challenges in PDS
Leakages in PDS: Leakages refer to food grains not reaching intended beneficiaries. According to 2011 data, leakages in PDS were estimated to be 46.7%.10,[11] Leakages may be of three types: (i) pilferage during transportation of food grains, (ii) diversion at fair price shops to non-beneficiaries, and (iii) exclusion of entitled beneficiaries from the list.6,[12]
In 2016, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) found that states had not completed the process of identifying beneficiaries, and 49% of the beneficiaries were yet to be identified. It also noted that inclusion and exclusion errors had been reported in the beneficiary lists.[13]
In February 2017, the Ministry made it mandatory for beneficiaries under NFSA to use Aadhaar as proof of identification for receiving food grains. Through this, the government aims to remove bogus ration cards, check leakages and ensure better delivery of food grains.10,[14] As of January 2017, while 100% ration cards had been digitised, the seeding of these cards with Aadhaar was at 73%.14
Storage: As of 2016-17, the total storage capacity in the country is 788 lakh tonnes, of which 354 lakh tonnes is with the Food Corporation of India and 424 lakh tonnes is with the state agencies.[15]
The CAG in its performance audit found that the available storage capacity in states was inadequate for the allocated quantity of food grains.13 For example, as of October 2015, of the 233 godowns sanctioned for construction in Maharashtra, only 93 had been completed. It also noted that in four of the last five years, the stock of food grains with the centre had been higher than the storage capacity available with Food Corporation of India.
Quality of food grains: A survey conducted in 2011 had noted that people complained about receiving poor quality food grain which had to be mixed with other grains to be edible.6 There have also been complaints about people receiving food grains containing alien substances such as pebbles. Poor quality of food may impact the willingness of people to buy food from fair price shops, and may have an adverse impact on their health.[16]
The Ministry has stated that while regular surveillance, monitoring, inspection and random sampling of all food items is under-taken by State Food Safety Officers, separate data for food grains distributed under PDS is unavailable.[17] In the absence of data with regard to quality testing results of food grains supplied under PDS, it may be difficult to ascertain whether these food items meet the prescribed quality and safety standards.
[1] About World Food Day, http://www.fao.org/world-food-day/2017/about/en/.
[2] Expenditure Budget, Union Budget 2017-18, http://unionbudget.nic.in/ub2017-18/eb/allsbe.pdf.
[3] National Food Security Act, 2013, http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/202013.pdf.
[4] “Prices, Agriculture and Food Management”, Chapter 5, Economic Survey 2015-16, http://unionbudget.nic.in/budget2016-2017/es2015-16/echapvol2-05.pdf.
[5] The Case for Direct Cash Transfers to the Poor, Economic and Political Weekly, April 2008, http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2008_43/15/The_Case_for_Direct_Cash_Transfers_to_the_Poor.pdf.
[6] Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and Explanations, The Economic and Political Weekly, November 5, 2011,
[7] ‘Report of the Internal Working Group on Branch Authorisation Policy’, Reserve Bank of India, September 2016, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/IWG99F12F147B6E4F8DBEE8CEBB8F09F103.PDF.
[8] Working Paper 294, “Leakages from Public Distribution System”, January 2015, ICRIER, http://icrier.org/pdf/Working_Paper_294.pdf.
[9] “The Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015”, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, September 3, 2015, http://dfpd.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/News/32_1_cash.pdf.
[10] Report of the High Level Committee on Reorienting the Role and Restructuring of Food Corporation of India, January 2015, http://www.fci.gov.in/app2/webroot/upload/News/Report%20of%20the%20High%20Level%20Committee%20on%20Reorienting%20the%20Role%20and%20Restructuring%20of%20FCI_English_1.pdf.
[11] Third Report of the Standing Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution: Demands for Grants 2015-16, Department of Food and Public Distribution, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Food,%20Consumer%20Affairs%20&%20Public%20Distribution/16_Food_Consumer_Affairs_And_Public_Distribution_3.pdf.
[12] Performance Evaluation of Targeted Public Distribution System, Planning Commission of India, March 2005, http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/peoreport/peo/peo_tpds.pdf.
[13] Audit on the Preparedness for Implementation of National Food Security Act, 2013 for the year ended March, 2015, Report No. 54 of 2015, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, http://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Civil_National_Food_Security_Report_54_of_2015.pdf.
[14] Unstarred Question No. 844, Lok Sabha, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Answered on February 7, 2017, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/11/AU844.pdf.
[15] Annual Report 2016-17, Department of Food & Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, http://dfpd.nic.in/writereaddata/images/annual-140217.pdf.
[16] 30 Food Subsidy, The Economic and Political Weekly, December 27, 2014, http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2014_49/52/Food_Subsidy.pdf.
[17] Unstarred Question No. 2124, Lok Sabha, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Answered on November 29, 2016, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/10/AU2124.pdf.
