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By Rohit & Anirudh A modified 'Modernization of State Police Forces' scheme was started by the central government in 2000-01. One of the objectives was to help police forces in meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism etc. The scheme aims to modernize police forces in terms of:

  • Mobility (including purchase of bullet proof and mine proof vehicles)
  • Weaponry
  • Communication Systems
  • Training
  • Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau
  • Equipments
  • Buildings

Under this scheme, States have been clubbed into different categories and Centre-State cost sharing is category specific. Since 2005-06, States have been categorized as category ‘A’ and ‘B’ with 100% and 75% Central funding respectively. All the North Eastern States, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim have been placed in category ‘A’ and thus, are entitled to receive 100% Central assistance for implementation of their annual approved plans. Recently, CAG decided to evaluate the working of the scheme and commissioned ‘performance audit’ reviews covering select general category and special category States. Each review covers a contiguous five year period between 2000 and 2007, but varies across selected states. For the periods under review, each state had a plan outlay (the total amount proposed to be spent in modernizing the state's police forces). However, in most cases, the actual release of funds fell significantly short of this outlay - in some cases the Centre did not contribute its share, in others the States lagged behind. For instance, in the case of Bihar, the Centre released only 56% of its share; while in the case of Rajasthan and West Bengal, the States did not release any funds at all. The graph below shows the actual releases by the Centre and the States (as percentages of their share in the proposed outlays): Further, even the funds that were released were not fully utilized. Thus, the amount finally spent fell significantly short of the initial proposal. The graph below shows the actual expenditure by State: Following are some of the other main findings from the CAG report:

Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces

Purpose for which money was sanctioned

Summary of CAG Findings

Planning

(Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.)

§ Submissions by the states to the MHA were delayed.

§ There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA.

§ In various states such as,

a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent money on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan.

b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police.

c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme.

Mobility

§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones.

§ The police response time was too long in some states.

§ To give examples from some states:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles.

b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent.

c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles.

Residential and non-residential buildings

§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy.

§ In states such as:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007).

b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan.

c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional because of shortage of manpower.

Weapons

§ Police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons.

§ Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow.

§ The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs.

b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations.

Communication

§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level.

§ Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower.

b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores.

Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau

§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure.

§ In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States.

§ In some states such as,

a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower.

b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months.

Training

§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low.

§ Training infrastructure was also inadequate.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained.

b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces.

Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS.

Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary.

Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces

Purpose for which money was sanctioned

Summary of CAG Findings

Planning

(Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.)

§ Submissions by the states to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were delayed.

§ There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA.

§ In various states such as,

a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent Rs 32 crore on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan.

b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police.

c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme.

Mobility

§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones, and no additions were made.

§ The police response time was too long in some states.

§ To give examples from some states:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles.

b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent.

c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles. 203 ambassador cars were procured, though only 55 were approved by the MHA.

Residential and non-residential buildings

§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy. Satisfaction levels with the housing provided were also very low.

§ In states such as:

a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007).

b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan, and only 1045 units were completed by 2006.

c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional even after spending Rs 2 crore because of shortage of manpower.

Weapons

§ It was observed that the police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons.

§ Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow.

§ The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs.

b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations.

Communication

§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level.

§ Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower.

b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores.

Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau

§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure.

§ In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States.

§ In some states such as,

a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower.

b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months.

Training

§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low.

§ Training infrastructure was also inadequate.

§ In some states such as,

a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained.

b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces.

Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS.

Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary.

The issue of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the Indian banking sector has become the subject of much discussion and scrutiny. The Standing Committee on Finance recently released a report on the banking sector in India, where it observed that banks’ capacity to lend has been severely affected because of mounting NPAs. The Estimates Committee of Lok Sabha is also currently examining the performance of public sector banks with respect to their burgeoning problem of NPAs, and loan recovery mechanisms available.

Additionally, guidelines for banks released by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in February 2018 regarding timely resolution of stressed assets have come under scrutiny, with multiple cases being filed in courts against the same. In this context, we examine the recent rise of NPAs in the country, some of their underlying causes, and steps taken so far to address the issue.

What is the extent and effect of the NPA problem in India?

Banks give loans and advances to borrowers. Based on the performance of the loan, it may be categorized as: (i) a standard asset (a loan where the borrower is making regular repayments), or (ii) a non-performing asset. NPAs are loans and advances where the borrower has stopped making interest or principal repayments for over 90 days.

As of March 31, 2018, provisional estimates suggest that the total volume of gross NPAs in the economy stands at Rs 10.35 lakh crore. About 85% of these NPAs are from loans and advances of public sector banks. For instance, NPAs in the State Bank of India are worth Rs 2.23 lakh crore.

In the last few years, gross NPAs of banks (as a percentage of total loans) have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 9.3% in 2017 (Figure 1). This indicates that an increasing proportion of a bank’s assets have ceased to generate income for the bank, lowering the bank’s profitability and its ability to grant further credit.

Escalating NPAs require a bank to make higher provisions for losses in their books. The banks set aside more funds to pay for anticipated future losses; and this, along with several structural issues, leads to low profitability. Profitability of a bank is measured by its Return on Assets (RoA), which is the ratio of the bank’s net profits to its net assets. Banks have witnessed a decline in their profitability in the last few years (Figure 2), making them vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and consequently putting consumer deposits at risk.

Capture

What led to the rise in NPAs?

Some of the factors leading to the increased occurrence of NPAs are external, such as decreases in global commodity prices leading to slower exports. Some are more intrinsic to the Indian banking sector.

A lot of the loans currently classified as NPAs originated in the mid-2000s, at a time when the economy was booming and business outlook was very positive. Large corporations were granted loans for projects based on extrapolation of their recent growth and performance. With loans being available more easily than before, corporations grew highly leveraged, implying that most financing was through external borrowings rather than internal promoter equity. But as economic growth stagnated following the global financial crisis of 2008, the repayment capability of these corporations decreased. This contributed to what is now known as India’s Twin Balance Sheet problem, where both the banking sector (that gives loans) and the corporate sector (that takes and has to repay these loans) have come under financial stress.

When the project for which the loan was taken started underperforming, borrowers lost their capability of paying back the bank. The banks at this time took to the practice of ‘evergreening’, where fresh loans were given to some promoters to enable them to pay off their interest. This effectively pushed the recognition of these loans as non-performing to a later date, but did not address the root causes of their unprofitability.

Further, recently there have also been frauds of high magnitude that have contributed to rising NPAs. Although the size of frauds relative to the total volume of NPAs is relatively small, these frauds have been increasing, and there have been no instances of high profile fraudsters being penalised.

What is being done to address the problem of growing NPAs?

The measures taken to resolve and prevent NPAs can broadly be classified into two kinds – first, regulatory means of resolving NPAs per various laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code), and second, remedial measures for banks prescribed and regulated by the RBI for internal restructuring of stressed assets.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was enacted in May 2016 to provide a time-bound 180-day recovery process for insolvent accounts (where the borrowers are unable to pay their dues). Under the IBC, the creditors of these insolvent accounts, presided over by an insolvency professional, decide whether to restructure the loan, or to sell the defaulter’s assets to recover the outstanding amount. If a timely decision is not arrived at, the defaulter’s assets are liquidated. Proceedings under the IBC are adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal for personal insolvencies, and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for corporate insolvencies. 701 cases have been registered and 176 cases have been resolved as of March 2018 under the IBC.

What changed recently in the RBI’s guidelines to banks?

Over the years, the RBI has issued various guidelines aimed at the resolution of stressed assets of banks. These included introduction of certain schemes such as: (i) Strategic Debt Restructuring (which allowed banks to change the management of the defaulting company), and (ii) Joint Lenders’ Forum (where lenders evolved a resolution plan and voted on its implementation). In line with the enactment of the IBC, the RBI, through a circular in February 2018, substituted all the specific pre-existing guidelines with a simplified, generic, time-bound framework for the resolution of stressed assets.

In the revised framework which replaced the earlier schemes, the RBI put in place a strict deadline of 180 days during which a resolution plan must be implemented, failing which stressed assets must be referred to the NCLT under IBC within 15 days. The framework also introduced a provision for monitoring of one-day defaults, where incipient stress is identified and flagged immediately when repayments are overdue by a day.

Borrowers whose loans were tagged as NPAs before the release of the circular recently crossed the 180-day deadline for internal resolution by banks. Some of these borrowers, including various power producers and sugar mills, had appealed against the RBI guidelines in various High Courts. A two-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court had recently ruled in favour of the RBI’s powers to issue these guidelines, and refused to grant interim relief to power producers from being taken to the NCLT for bankruptcy. All lawsuits against the circular have currently been transferred to the Supreme Court, which has now issued an order to maintain status quo on the same. This means that these cases cannot be referred to the NCLT until the Supreme Court’s decision on the circular, although the RBI’s 180-day deadline has passed. This effectively provides interim relief to the errant borrowers who had moved to court till the next hearing of the apex court on this matter, which is scheduled for November 2018.