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The National Medical Commission Bill, 2017 was introduced in Lok Sabha recently and is listed for consideration and passage today.[1]  The Bill seeks to regulate medical education and practice in India.  To meet this objective, the Bill repeals the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and dissolves the current Medical Council of India (MCI).  The MCI was established under the 1956 Act, to establish uniform standards of higher education qualifications in medicine and regulating its practice.[2]

A Committee was set up in 2016, under the NITI Aayog with Dr. Arvind Panagariya as its chair, to review the 1956 Act and recommend changes to improve medical education and the quality of doctors in India.[3]  The Committee proposed that the Act be replaced by a new law, and also proposed a draft Bill in August 2016.

This post looks at the key provisions of the National Medical Commission Bill, 2017 introduced in Lok Sabha recently, and some issues which have been raised over the years regarding the regulation of medical education and practice in the country.

What are the key issues regarding the regulation of medical education and practice?

Several experts have examined the functioning of the MCI and suggested a different structure and governance system for its regulatory powers.3,[4]  Some of the issues raised by them include:

Separation of regulatory powers

Over the years, the MCI has been criticised for its slow and unwieldy functioning owing to the concentration and centralisation of all regulatory functions in one single body.  This is because the Council regulates medical education as well as medical practice.  In this context, there have been recommendations that all professional councils like the MCI, should be divested of their academic functions, which should be subsumed under an apex body for higher education to be called the National Commission for Higher Education and Research.[5]  This way there would be a separation between the regulation of medical education from regulation of medical practice.

An Expert Committee led by Prof. Ranjit Roy Chaudhury (2015), recommended structurally reconfiguring the MCI’s functions and suggested the formation of a National Medical Commission through a new Act.3   Here, the National Medical Commission would be an umbrella body for supervision of medical education and oversight of medial practice.  It will have four segregated verticals under it to look at: (i) under-graduate medical education, (ii) post-graduate medical education, (iii) accreditation of medical institutions, and (iv) the registration of doctors.  The 2017 Bill also creates four separate autonomous bodies for similar functions.

Composition of MCI

With most members of the MCI being elected, the NITI Aayog Committee (2016) noted the conflict of interest where the regulated elect the regulators, preventing the entry of skilled professionals for the job.  The Committee recommended that a framework must be set up under which regulators are appointed through an independent selection process instead.

Fee Regulation 

The NITI Aayog Committee (2016) recommended that a medical regulatory authority, such as the MCI, should not engage in fee regulation of private colleges.  Such regulation of fee by regulatory authorities may encourage an underground economy for medical education seats with capitation fees (any payment in excess of the regular fee), in regulated private colleges.  Further, the Committee stated that having a fee cap may discourage the entry of private colleges limiting the expansion of medical education in the country.

Professional conduct

The Standing Committee on Health (2016) observed that the present focus of the MCI is only on licensing of medical colleges.4  There is no emphasis given to the enforcement of medical ethics in education and on instances of corruption noted within the MCI.  In light of this, the Committee recommended that the areas of medical education and medical practice should be separated in terms of enforcement of the appropriate ethics for each of these stages.

What does the National Medical Commission, 2017 Bill seek do to?

The 2017 Bill sets up the National Medical Commission (NMC) as an umbrella regulatory body with certain other bodies under it. The NMC will subsume the MCI and will regulate the medical education and practice in India.   Under the Bill, states will establish their respective State Medical Councils within three years.  These Councils will have a role similar to the NMC, at the state level.

Functions of the NMC include: (i) laying down policies for regulating medical institutions and medical professionals, (ii) assessing the requirements of human resources and infrastructure in healthcare, (iii) ensuring compliance by the State Medical Councils with the regulations made under the Bill, and (iv) framing guidelines for determination of fee for up to 40% of the seats in the private medical institutions and deemed universities which are governed by the Bill.

Who will be a part of the NMC?

The NMC will consist of 25 members, appointed by the central government.  It will include representatives from Indian Council of Medical Research, and Directorate General of Health Services. A search committee will recommend names to the central government for the post of Chairperson, and the part-time members.  These posts will have a maximum term of four years, and will not be eligible for extension or reappointment.

What are the regulatory bodies being set up under the NMC?

The Bill sets up four autonomous boards under the supervision of the NMC, as recommended by various experts.  Each autonomous board will consist of a President and two members, appointed by the central government (on the recommendation of the search committee).  These bodies are:

  • The Under-Graduate Medical Education Board (UGMEB) and the Post-Graduate Medical Education Board (PGMEB): These two bodies will be responsible for formulating standards, curriculum, guidelines, and granting recognition to medical qualifications at the under-graduate and post-graduate levels respectively;
  • The Medical Assessment and Rating Board: The Board will have the power to levy monetary penalties on institutions which fail to maintain the minimum standards as laid down by the UGMEB and the PGMEB.  It will also grant permissions for establishing new medical colleges; and
  • The Ethics and Medical Registration Board: The Board will maintain a National Register of all licensed medical practitioners, and regulate professional conduct.  Only those included in the Register will be allowed to practice as doctors.

What does the Bill say regarding the conduct of medical entrance examinations?

There will be a uniform National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) for admission to under-graduate medical education in all medical institutions governed by the Bill.  The NMC will specify the manner of conducting common counselling for admission in all such medical institutions.

Further, there will be a National Licentiate Examination for the students graduating from medical institutions to obtain the license for practice.  This Examination will also serve as the basis for admission into post-graduate courses at medical institutions.

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[1] The National Medical Commission Bill, 2017, http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/medical%20commission/National%20Medical%20Commission%20Bill,%202017.pdf.

[2] Indian Medical Council Act, 1933.

[3] A Preliminary Report of the Committee on the Reform of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, NITI Aayog, August 7, 2016, http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/MCI%20Report%20.pdf.

[4] “Report no. 92: Functioning of the Medical Council of India”, Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare, March 8, 2016, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Health%20and%20Family%20Welfare/92.pdf

[5] “Report of the Committee to Advise on Renovation and Rejuvenation of Higher Education”, Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2009, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/YPC-Report.pdf.

This week, the centre issued two Ordinances to amend: (i) the Salary, Allowances, and Pension of Members of Parliament Act, 1954 to reduce the salaries of MPs by 30% for a period of one year, and (ii) the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952, to reduce the sumptuary allowance of Ministers by 30% for one year.  The government also amended the rules notified under the 1954 Act to reduce certain allowances of MPs for one year, and suspended the MPLAD Scheme for two years.  These changes are being made to supplement the financial resources of the centre to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic.  These amendments raise larger questions on the effect they have on the capacity of the state to fight the pandemic, and the way in which salaries of MPs should be determined.

Overview of Amendments

The 1954 Act lays out the salary and various allowances that an MP is entitled to during their term in Parliament and also provides pension to former MPs.  MPs receive a salary of one lakh rupees per month, along with compensation for official expenses through various allowances.  These include a daily allowance for attending Parliament, constituency allowance and office expense allowance.  Under the first Ordinance, the salaries of MPs are being reduced by 30%.  Further, the constituency allowance and office expense allowance are being reduced by Rs 21,000 and Rs 6,000, respectively. 

The 1952 Act regulates the salaries and other allowances of Ministers (including the Prime Minister).  The Act provides for the payment of a monthly sumptuary allowance (for expenditure incurred in entertaining visitors) at different rates to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers.  The second Ordinance is reducing the sumptuary allowances of Ministers by 30%. 

Note that the 1952 Act pegs the salaries, and daily and constituency allowances of Ministers to the rates specified for an MP under the 1954 Act.  Similar provisions apply to presiding officers of both Houses (other than Chairman of Rajya Sabha) who are regulated by a different Act.  Therefore, the amendments to the salaries and constituency allowance of MPs will also apply to Ministers, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha, and Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha.  The salary of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha will continue to remain unaffected by the Ordinances (Rs 4 lakh per month). 

Further, since 1993, MPs can also identify projects and sanction certain funds every year for public works in their constituencies under the Members of Parliament and Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme, 1993.  Since 2011-12, each MP can spend up to Rs five crore per year under the scheme.  The Union Cabinet has approved the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme for two years.  Table 1 below compares the changes in salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs.

Table 1: Comparison of changes in the salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs

Feature

Previous entitlement (in Rs per month)

New entitlement (in Rs per month)

Changes for the period of

Salary

 1,00,000

70,000

One year

Constituency allowance

70,000

49,000

One year

Office allowance

60,000

54,000

One year

Of which

Office expenses

20,000

14,000

-

 

Secretarial assistance

40,000

40,000

-

Sumptuary allowance of Prime Minister

3,000

2,100

One year

Sumptuary allowance of Cabinet Ministers

2,000

1,400

One year

Sumptuary allowance of Ministers of State

1,000

700

One year

Sumptuary allowance of Deputy Ministers

600

420

One year

Funds under MPLAD Scheme

5 crore

NIL

Two years

Sources: 2020 Ordinances; Members of Parliament (Constituency Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; Members of Parliament (Office Expense Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; “Cabinet approves Non-operation of MPLADs for two years (2020-21 and 2021-22) for managing COVID 19”, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet, April 6, 2020; PRS.

Effect of amendments on resources to fight COVID-19

The proposed reduction to the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers amounts to savings of around Rs 55 crore, and the suspension of the MPLAD scheme is expected to save Rs 7800 crore.  These measures comprise 0.03% and 4.5% respectively, of the estimated amount required to fight the immediate economic distress unleashed due to COVID.  Government has estimated Rs 1.7 lakh crore as the requirement for COVID relief measures under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana.  Therefore, such measures to decrease MP salaries and allowances toward increasing the pool of funds for fighting the pandemic are likely to have an almost negligible impact.

How might MP salaries be set

Each MP is required to represent the interests of his constituents, formulate legislation on important national matters, hold the government accountable, and ensure efficient allocation of public resources.  The salary and office allowance of an MP must be assessed in light of the responsibilities expected to be discharged by them. Ensuring MPs are reasonably compensated in terms of salaries allows MPs the means to be able to discharge their duties devotedly, enables them to make decisions in an independent manner and guarantees that citizens from all walks of life can stand a chance of running for Parliament.  The question remains – who decides what is reasonable compensation for MPs. 

Currently, MPs in India decide their own salaries which is passed in the form of an Act of Parliament.  MPs setting their own pay leads to a conflict of interest.  A way to resolve this is by setting up an independent commission to determine that salaries of MPs.  This is a practice followed in certain democracies, such as New Zealand and United Kingdom.  In some other countries, it is pegged to annual wage rate index such as Canada.  Table 2 lists various methods used in some other countries to set salaries for legislators.

Table 2: Methods for setting salaries in different democracies

Countries

Process of determining salary of legislators

India

Parliament decides by passing an Act.

Australia

Remuneration Tribunal decides the salary.  This is revised annually.

New Zealand

Remuneration Authority decides the salary.  This is revised annually.

UK

Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority sets the pay annually as per the changes in average earnings in the public sector given by the Office for National Statistics.

Canada

Member’s pay is adjusted each year to federal government’s annual wage rate index.

Germany

Based on income of a judge of the highest federal court and adjusted annually by the Parliament. 

Sources: Various government websites of respective countries; PRS.

India has experience with appointing independent commissions to examine the emoluments of government officials.  The central government periodically sets up pay commissions to review and recommend changes to the wage structure of government employees with a view to attract talent to government services.  The latest Central Pay Commission was constituted in 2014 to decides the emoluments of central government employees, armed forces personnel, employees of statutory bodies, and officers and employees of the Supreme Court.  Typically, the Commissions have been chaired by a former Judge of the Supreme Court, and have included members representing government service and independent experts.

Suspending  MPLADS

In contrast to these amendments, the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme is a positive step.   

The MPLAD Scheme (MPLADS) was introduced in December 1993 to enable legislators to address local developmental problems for their constituents.  MPLADS allows legislators to earmark up to five crore rupees every year on public works projects in their constituency and recommend these projects to the district authorities for implementation.  Typically, funds under the MPLADS are expended on construction or installation of public facilities (such as school buildings, roads, and electrical facilities), supply of equipment (such as, computers in educational institutions) and sanitation projects. 

In 2010, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court decided a challenge to the constitutionality of the MPLADS.  It was argued that MPLADS violates the concept of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature since it provides the MP with executive powers on local public works.  The Court ruled that there was no violation of the principle of separation of powers because the role of an MP in this case is recommendatory and the actual work is carried out by the local authorities. 

However, the Scheme has undermined the role of an MP as a national-level policy maker.  The role of an MP is to determine whether government’s budgetary allocations across development priorities are appropriate and once the money is sanctioned by Parliament is it being spent in an efficient and efficacious manner.  However, focus on local administration-level issues, such as development of roads or sanitation projects, obscures the role of the MP in conducting oversight.  Another fall out of having MPs responsible for MPLADS is that it skews the expectations of citizens have of their MPs – holding them accountable for resolving local development issues rather than broader policy and legislative decision making. The suspension of MPLADs will allow for MPs to focus on their role in Parliament.  

The Ordinance route

Through these Ordinances, the executive has amended the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers.  In principle, Parliament is discharged with law-making powers.  In exceptional circumstances, the Constitution permits the executive to make laws through Ordinances if Parliament is not in session and immediate action is required.  The two Ordinances will have to be ratified by Parliament within six weeks of its sitting in order to continue to have the force of law.  Interestingly, India is one of the few countries, apart from Bangladesh and Pakistan, that vests the executive with authority to make laws, even if temporary in nature. 

The Ordinance amending the salaries of MPs also raises a question on whether it is appropriate that the executive has the power to amend the emoluments of MPs – how would this affect the independence of the legislature which is tasked with holding the executive accountable.