The issue of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the Indian banking sector has become the subject of much discussion and scrutiny. The Standing Committee on Finance recently released a report on the banking sector in India, where it observed that banks’ capacity to lend has been severely affected because of mounting NPAs. The Estimates Committee of Lok Sabha is also currently examining the performance of public sector banks with respect to their burgeoning problem of NPAs, and loan recovery mechanisms available.

Additionally, guidelines for banks released by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in February 2018 regarding timely resolution of stressed assets have come under scrutiny, with multiple cases being filed in courts against the same. In this context, we examine the recent rise of NPAs in the country, some of their underlying causes, and steps taken so far to address the issue.

What is the extent and effect of the NPA problem in India?

Banks give loans and advances to borrowers. Based on the performance of the loan, it may be categorized as: (i) a standard asset (a loan where the borrower is making regular repayments), or (ii) a non-performing asset. NPAs are loans and advances where the borrower has stopped making interest or principal repayments for over 90 days.

As of March 31, 2018, provisional estimates suggest that the total volume of gross NPAs in the economy stands at Rs 10.35 lakh crore. About 85% of these NPAs are from loans and advances of public sector banks. For instance, NPAs in the State Bank of India are worth Rs 2.23 lakh crore.

In the last few years, gross NPAs of banks (as a percentage of total loans) have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 9.3% in 2017 (Figure 1). This indicates that an increasing proportion of a bank’s assets have ceased to generate income for the bank, lowering the bank’s profitability and its ability to grant further credit.

Escalating NPAs require a bank to make higher provisions for losses in their books. The banks set aside more funds to pay for anticipated future losses; and this, along with several structural issues, leads to low profitability. Profitability of a bank is measured by its Return on Assets (RoA), which is the ratio of the bank’s net profits to its net assets. Banks have witnessed a decline in their profitability in the last few years (Figure 2), making them vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and consequently putting consumer deposits at risk.

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What led to the rise in NPAs?

Some of the factors leading to the increased occurrence of NPAs are external, such as decreases in global commodity prices leading to slower exports. Some are more intrinsic to the Indian banking sector.

A lot of the loans currently classified as NPAs originated in the mid-2000s, at a time when the economy was booming and business outlook was very positive. Large corporations were granted loans for projects based on extrapolation of their recent growth and performance. With loans being available more easily than before, corporations grew highly leveraged, implying that most financing was through external borrowings rather than internal promoter equity. But as economic growth stagnated following the global financial crisis of 2008, the repayment capability of these corporations decreased. This contributed to what is now known as India’s Twin Balance Sheet problem, where both the banking sector (that gives loans) and the corporate sector (that takes and has to repay these loans) have come under financial stress.

When the project for which the loan was taken started underperforming, borrowers lost their capability of paying back the bank. The banks at this time took to the practice of ‘evergreening’, where fresh loans were given to some promoters to enable them to pay off their interest. This effectively pushed the recognition of these loans as non-performing to a later date, but did not address the root causes of their unprofitability.

Further, recently there have also been frauds of high magnitude that have contributed to rising NPAs. Although the size of frauds relative to the total volume of NPAs is relatively small, these frauds have been increasing, and there have been no instances of high profile fraudsters being penalised.

What is being done to address the problem of growing NPAs?

The measures taken to resolve and prevent NPAs can broadly be classified into two kinds – first, regulatory means of resolving NPAs per various laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code), and second, remedial measures for banks prescribed and regulated by the RBI for internal restructuring of stressed assets.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was enacted in May 2016 to provide a time-bound 180-day recovery process for insolvent accounts (where the borrowers are unable to pay their dues). Under the IBC, the creditors of these insolvent accounts, presided over by an insolvency professional, decide whether to restructure the loan, or to sell the defaulter’s assets to recover the outstanding amount. If a timely decision is not arrived at, the defaulter’s assets are liquidated. Proceedings under the IBC are adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal for personal insolvencies, and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for corporate insolvencies. 701 cases have been registered and 176 cases have been resolved as of March 2018 under the IBC.

What changed recently in the RBI’s guidelines to banks?

Over the years, the RBI has issued various guidelines aimed at the resolution of stressed assets of banks. These included introduction of certain schemes such as: (i) Strategic Debt Restructuring (which allowed banks to change the management of the defaulting company), and (ii) Joint Lenders’ Forum (where lenders evolved a resolution plan and voted on its implementation). In line with the enactment of the IBC, the RBI, through a circular in February 2018, substituted all the specific pre-existing guidelines with a simplified, generic, time-bound framework for the resolution of stressed assets.

In the revised framework which replaced the earlier schemes, the RBI put in place a strict deadline of 180 days during which a resolution plan must be implemented, failing which stressed assets must be referred to the NCLT under IBC within 15 days. The framework also introduced a provision for monitoring of one-day defaults, where incipient stress is identified and flagged immediately when repayments are overdue by a day.

Borrowers whose loans were tagged as NPAs before the release of the circular recently crossed the 180-day deadline for internal resolution by banks. Some of these borrowers, including various power producers and sugar mills, had appealed against the RBI guidelines in various High Courts. A two-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court had recently ruled in favour of the RBI’s powers to issue these guidelines, and refused to grant interim relief to power producers from being taken to the NCLT for bankruptcy. All lawsuits against the circular have currently been transferred to the Supreme Court, which has now issued an order to maintain status quo on the same. This means that these cases cannot be referred to the NCLT until the Supreme Court’s decision on the circular, although the RBI’s 180-day deadline has passed. This effectively provides interim relief to the errant borrowers who had moved to court till the next hearing of the apex court on this matter, which is scheduled for November 2018.

On November 28, 2012, the Comptroller and Auditor General submitted its report on the implementation of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).  According to the report most of the projects initiated under JNNURM have not been completed.  For instance with respect to urban infrastructure projects, only 231 projects out of the 1298 sanctioned projects have been completed.  Similarly, with respect to housing projects, only 22 of the 1517 projects have been completed.  Some of the other key recommendations of the report are:

  •  Some of the reasons for the delay in completing the projects include: (i) delay in acquiring land; (ii) deficiency in preparation of projects; and (iii) non-identification of beneficiaries which increased the risk of ineligible beneficiaries getting the benefits.
  •  A total allocation of Rs 66,084 crore had been made by the Planning Commission.  However, against this total allocation, the central government had made an allocation of only Rs 37,070 out of which until March 30, 2011 only Rs 32,934 had been released.
  • There was a delay in releasing these funds to the states.  A large portion of the funds was released only in the last quarter and more particularly in March.
  • The JNNURM guidelines were deficient as they did not provide adequate guidance to the states on the method of parking the funds and utilization of interest.

The need and objectives of JNNURM According to the 2011 census India’s urban population has increased from 286 million in 2001 to 377 million in 2011 .  With the increase in urban population, there is a requirement to improve the urban infrastructure and improve the service delivery mechanisms.  With these specific objectives in mind, the central government launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 2005-2006.  The aim of the Mission is to encourage reforms and fast track planned development of identified cities (such as cities with a population of more than 1 million as per the 2001 census).  JNNURM has two main components namely : (i) Urban Infrastructure and Governance  and (ii) Urban Infrastructure Development for Small and Medium Towns. The duration of JNNURM was from 2005-06 to 2011-12. However, as the projects have not been completed the Government has extended its duration until March 2014. Funds for JNNURM The funds for JNNURM are provided through the Additional Central Assistance.  This implies that the funds are provided as grants to the states directly from the centre.   In the 2012 Union Budget, the central government has allocated Rs 12,522 crore for JNNURM. This represents around 10 % of the total central assistance through the different schemes to states and union territories in 2012-13. As on June 30 2012, 554 projects at a total cost of Rs 62,253 crore have been sanctioned under the Urban Infrastructure and Governance sub-mission of JNNURM.   The table below shows the status of the sanctioned JNNURM  projects in the different states. State wise status of the projects under JNNURM                 (as on August 6, 2012)

Name of State Total Allocation (Rs Lakh) Number of sanctioned projects Completed Projects
Andhra Pradesh 2,11,845 52 18
Arunachal Pradesh 10,740 3 NA
Assam 27,320 2 NA
Bihar 59,241 8 NA
Chandigarh 27,087 3 NA
Chattisgarh 24,803 1 NA
Delhi 2,82,318 23 4
Goa 12,094 2 NA
Gujarat 2,57,881 72 40
Haryana 32,332 4 NA
Himachal Pradesh 13,066 5 NA
Jammu & Kashmir 48,836 5 NA
Jharkhand 94,120 5 NA
Karnataka 1,52,459 47 22
Kerala 67,476 11 NA
Madhya Pradesh 1,32,850 23 7
Maharashtra 5,50,555 80 21
Manipur 15,287 3 NA
Meghalaya 15,668 2 NA
Mizoram 14,822 4 NA
Nagaland 11,628 3 NA
Orissa 32,235 5 NA
Punjab 70,775 6 1
Puducherry 20,680 2 NA
Rajasthan 74,869 13 2
Sikkim 10,613 2 NA
Tamil Nadu 2,25,066 48 12
Tripura 14,018 2 NA
Uttar Pradesh 2,76,941 33 4
Uttarakhand 40,534 14 NA
West Bengal 3,21,840 69 15

Source: Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission; PRS.

  • Gujarat at 55.55% has the highest number of completed projects, while Uttar Pradesh at 12.24% has the lowest number of completed projects.
  • Out of the larger states, Delhi and Maharashtra at 17% and 26% have a comparatively low rate of completed projects.
  • Maharashtra has the highest number of sanctioned projects, while the North Eastern states, Chattisgarh and Puducherry have the lowest number of sanctioned projects.