The National Medical Commission (NMC) Bill, 2017 was introduced in Lok Sabha in December, 2017.  It was examined by the Standing Committee on Health, which submitted its report during Budget Session 2018.  The Bill seeks to regulate medical education and practice in India.  In this post, we analyse the Bill in its current form.

How is medical education and practice regulated currently?

The Medical Council of India (MCI) is responsible for regulating medical education and practice.  Over the years, there have been several issues with the functioning of the MCI with respect to its regulatory role, composition, allegations of corruption, and lack of accountability.   For example, MCI is an elected body where its members are elected by medical practitioners themselves, i.e. the regulator is elected by the regulated.  In light of such issues, experts recommended nomination based constitution of the MCI instead of election, and separating the regulation of medical education and medical practice.  They suggested that legislative changes should be brought in to overhaul the functioning of the MCI.

To meet this objective, the Bill repeals the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and dissolves the current Medical Council of India (MCI) which regulates medical education and practice.

Who will be a part of the NMC?

The NMC will consist of 25 members, of which at least 17 (68%) will be medical practitioners.  The Standing Committee has noted that the current MCI is non-diverse and consists mostly of doctors who look out for their own self-interest over larger public interest.   In order to reduce the monopoly of doctors, it recommended that the MCI should include diverse stakeholders such as public health experts, social scientists, and health economists.  In other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council (GMC) responsible for regulating medical education and practice consists of 12 medical practitioners and 12 lay members (such as community health members, and administrators from the local government).

How will the issues of medical misconduct be addressed?

The State Medical Council will receive complaints relating to professional or ethical misconduct against a registered doctor.  If the doctor is aggrieved by the decision of the State Medical Council, he may appeal to the Ethics and Medical Registration Board, and further before the NMC.  Appeals against the decision of the NMC will lie before the central government.  It is unclear why the central government is an appellate authority with regard to such matters.

It may be argued that disputes related to ethics and misconduct in medical practice may require judicial expertise.  For example, in the UK, the GMC receives complaints with regard to ethical misconduct and is required to do an initial documentary investigation.  It then forwards the complaint to a Tribunal, which is a judicial body independent of the GMC.  The adjudication and final disciplinary action is decided by the Tribunal.

What will the NMC’s role be in fee regulation of private medical colleges?

In India, the Supreme Court has held that private providers of education have to operate as charitable and not for profit institutions.   Despite this, many private education institutions continue to charge exorbitant fees which makes medical education unaffordable and inaccessible to meritorious students.  Currently, for private unaided medical colleges, the fee structure is decided by a committee set up by state governments under the chairmanship of a retired High Court judge.  The Bill allows the NMC to frame guidelines for determination of fees for up to 40% of seats in private medical colleges and deemed universities.  The question is whether the NMC as a regulator should regulate fees charged by private medical colleges.

NITI Aayog Committee (2016) was of the opinion that a fee cap would discourage the entry of private colleges, therefore, limiting the expansion of medical education.  It also observed that it is difficult to enforce such a fee cap and could lead medical colleges to continue charging high fees under other pretexts.

Note that the Parliamentary Standing Committee (2018) which examined the Bill has recommended continuing the current system of fee structures being decided by the Committee under the chairmanship of a retired High Court judge.  However, for those private medical colleges and deemed universities, unregulated under the existing mechanism, fee must be regulated for at least 50% of the seats.  The Union Cabinet has approved an Amendment to increase the regulation of fees to 50% of seats.

How will doctors become eligible to practice?

The Bill introduces a National Licentiate Examination for students graduating from medical institutions in order to obtain a licence to practice as a medical professional.

However, the NMC may permit a medical practitioner to perform surgery or practice medicine without qualifying the National Licentiate Examination, in such circumstances and for such period as may be specified by regulations.  The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has clarified that this exemption is not meant to allow doctors failing the National Licentiate Examination to practice but is intended to allow medical professionals like nurse practitioners and dentists to practice.  It is unclear from the Bill that the term ‘medical practitioner’ includes medical professionals (like nurses) other than MBBS doctors.

Further, the Bill does not specify the validity period of this licence to practice.  In other countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, a licence to practice needs to be periodically renewed.  For example, in the UK the licence has to be renewed every five years, and in Australia it has to renewed annually.

What are the issues around the bridge course for AYUSH practitioners to prescribe modern medicine?

The debate around AYUSH practitioners prescribing modern medicine

There is a provision in the Bill which states that there may be a bridge course which AYUSH practitioners (practicing Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy) can undertake in order to prescribe certain kinds of modern medicine.  There are differing views on whether AYUSH practitioners should prescribe modern medicines.

Over the years, various committees have recommended a functional integration among various systems of medicine i.e. Ayurveda, modern medicine, and others.  On the other hand, experts state that the bridge course may promote the positioning of AYUSH practitioners as stand-ins for allopathic doctors owing to the shortage of doctors across the country.  This in turn may affect the development of AYUSH systems of medicine as independent systems of medicine.

Moreover, AYUSH doctors do not have to go through any licentiate examination to be registered by the NMC, unlike the other doctors.  Recently, the Union Cabinet has approved an Amendment to remove the provision of the bridge course.

Status of other kinds of medical personnel

As of January 2018, the doctor to population ratio in India was 1:1655 compared to the World Health Organisation standard of 1:1000.  The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare stated that the introduction of the bridge course for AYUSH practitioners under the Bill will help fill in the gaps of availability of medical professionals.

If the purpose of the bridge course is to address shortage of medical professionals, it is unclear why the option to take the bridge course does not apply to other cadres of allopathic medical professionals such as nurses, and dentists.  There are other countries where medical professionals other than doctors are allowed to prescribe allopathic medicine.  For example, Nurse Practitioners in the USA provide a full range of primary, acute, and specialty health care services, including ordering and performing diagnostic tests, and prescribing medications.  For this purpose, Nurse Practitioners must complete a master’s or doctoral degree program, advanced clinical training, and obtain a national certification.

There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector.  On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal.  The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country.  However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane.  The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished.  Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist.  For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill.  Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated.  It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers.  States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests.  States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills.  Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP.  It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles.  The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar.  This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS).  At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar.  States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis.  Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis.  Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year.  The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers).  Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations.  This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane.  As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small.  Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%.  This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.