The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology released three draft policies on telecommunications, information technology and electronics. The Ministry has invited comments on the draft policies, which may be sent to epolicy2011@mit.gov.in. These policies have the common goal of increasing revenues and increasing global market share. However, the policies may be incompatible with the Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 (DTC) and India’s international obligations under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Below we discuss these policies within the scope of the GATT and the DTC. The draft National Information Technology Policy, 2011 aims to formulate a fiscal structure to attract investment in the IT industry in tier II and III cities. It also seeks to prepare SMEs for a competitive environment by providing fiscal benefits. Similarly, the draft National Electronics Policy provides for fiscal incentives in manufacturing on account of infrastructure gaps relating to power, transportation etc. and to mitigate the relatively high cost of finance. The draft policy also provides preferential market access for domestically manufactured or designed electronic products including mobile devices and SIM cards. The draft National Telecom Policy seeks to provide fiscal incentives required by indigenous manufacturers of telecom products and R&D institutions. The theme of the DTC was to remove distortions arising from incentives. The detailed note annexed to the Bill states that “tax incentives are inefficient, distorting, iniquitous, impose greater compliance burden on the tax payer and on the administration, result in loss of revenue, create special interest groups, add to the complexity of the tax laws, and encourage tax avoidance and rent seeking behaviour.” It further notes that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on finance had recommended removal of exemptions other than in exceptional cases. As per the Department of Revenue, tax holidays should only be given in businesses with extremely high risks, lumpy investments and lengthy gestation periods. The DTC also removes location-based incentives as these “lead to diversion of resources to areas where there is no comparative advantage”. These also lead to tax evasion and avoidance, and huge administrative costs. The proposals to provide fiscal incentives in all three draft policies contradict the direction of the direct tax reforms. Article 3 of GATT provides that foreign products should be accorded the same treatment accorded to similar domestic products in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution and use. The provisions in the draft electronics policy to secure preferential market access to products manufactured in India may contravene this Article. In granting such fiscal and trade incentives, the policies may be contrary to the approach adopted in the DTC and India’s obligations under the GATT. These draft policies will have to be reconciled with tax reforms and trade obligations.
In law, the addition or deletion a single punctuation or a single word can have a major impact on the effect of that law. One such example can be seen from the recommended changes in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010 by Parliament’s Standing Committee. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on May 7, 2010. The Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests, which submitted its report on the Bill yesterday (August 18, 2010). The Committee has made a number of recommendations regarding certain clauses in the Bill (See summary here). One of these may have the effect of diluting the provision currently in the Bill. The main recommendations pertain to:
Clause 17 of the Bill which gives operators a right of recourse against those actually causing damage had been opposed as it was felt that it was not strong enough to hold suppliers liable in case the damage was caused by them. Clause 17 gave a right of recourse under three conditions. The exact clause is reproduced below: The operator of a nuclear installation shall have a right of recourse where — (a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing; (b) the nuclear incident has resulted from the wilful act or gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or services, or of his employee; (c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of a person done with the intent to cause nuclear damage. Under this clause, a right of recourse exists when (a) there is a contract giving such a right, or (b) the supplier acts deliberately or in a grossly negligent manner to cause nuclear damage, or (c) a person causes nuclear damage with the intent to do so. If any of the three cases can be proved by the operator, he has a right of recourse. The Committee has stated that “Clause 17(b) gives escape route to the suppliers of nuclear materials, equipments, services of his employees as their willful act or gross negligence would be difficult to establish in a civil nuclear compensation case.” It recommended that Clause 17(b) should be modified to cover consequences “of latent or patent defect, supply of sub-standard material, defective equipment or services or from the gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or service.” The Committee also recommended another change in Clause 17. It recommended that clause 17(a) may end with “and”. This provision may dilute the right of recourse available to operators. The modified clause 17 would read as: The operator of a nuclear installation shall have a right of recourse where — (a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing; and, (b) the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of latent or patent defect, supply of sub-standard material, defective equipment or services or from the gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or services.; (c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of a person done with the intent to cause nuclear damage. This implies that for Clauses 17(b) or (c) to be applicable, the condition specified in clause 17(a) has to be compulsorily satisfied. Two examples highlight the consequence of the recommended change in Clause 17(a) of the Bill:
The effect of the changes recommended by the committee may thus dilute the provision as it exists in the Bill. The table below compares the position in the Bill and the position as per the Standing Committee’s recommendations:
| Right of recourse - The Bill gives operators a right to recourse under three conditions: (a) if there is a clear contract; (b) if the damage is caused by someone with intent to cause damage; (c) against suppliers if damage is caused by their wilful act or negligence. | In the Bill the three conditions are separated by a semi-colon. The Committee recommended that the semi-colon in clause 17(a) should be replaced by “and”. | This might imply that all three conditions mentioned need to exist for an operator to have recourse. |
| Right to recourse against suppliers exists in cases of “willful act or gross negligence on the part of the supplier”. (Clause 17) | The Committee felt that the right of recourse against suppliers is vague. It recommended that recourse against the supplier should be strengthened. The supplier is liable if an incident has occurred due to (i) defects, or (ii) sub-standard material, or (iii) gross negligence of the supplier of the material, equipment or services. | The variance with the Convention continues to exist. |
