The presentation of the Annual Budget before the parliament is one of the mechanisms available to any legislature to scrutinise and authorise revenues and expenditures of the country. In this post I quote and summarise from two sources (Rick Stapenhurst, "The legislature and the Budget", in Legislative Oversight and Budgeting, World Bank Institute Development Studies, and The evolution of parliament’s power of the purse) which describe briefly how oversight by the legislature over the state's finances evolved historically. "The evolution of legislative "power of the purse" dates back to medieval times, when knights and burgesses in England were summoned to confirm the assent of local communities to the raising of additional taxes." By the 1300s the English parliament had begun to use its power to vote on funds depending on the acceptance of petitions presented by parliament to the monarch. In 1341, the monarch agreed that citizens should not be taxed ("charged or grieved to make common aid or sustain charge") without the assent of Parliament. "In parallel, the English Parliament began to take an interest in how money was collected, as well as how it was spent." In the 1300's itself, it started appointing commissioners to audit the accounts of tax collectors. This power of oversight however evolved gradually, and particularly over the 16th century, when the "monarchs needed parliamentary support and voting of funds for their various political and religious battles. King Henry VIII for example, gave Parliament enhanced status in policy making, in return for support during his battles with Rome." The 1689 Bill of Rights firmly established "the principle that only Parliament could authorize taxation. Still, at this stage there was still no such thing as an annual budget, and there was no comprehensive control of expenditures." The British Parliament also passed a resolution in 1713 to limit Parliament's power to "not vote sums in excess of the Government’s estimates. Consequently, the only amendments that are in order are those which aim to reduce the sums requested." "Since that time, the "power of the purse" function has been performed by legislatures around the world as a means to expand their democratic leverage on behalf of citizens."
The Gujarat High Court is hearing an important case related to the appointment of the Lokayukta in Gujarat. The issue is whether the Governor can appoint the Lokayukta at his discretion or whether appointment can be made only upon obtaining the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister. During the period 2006-2010, the Gujarat state government submitted names of two prospective appointees for the post of Lokayukta to the Governor. But no appointment was made during this period. On August 26, 2011 the Governor appointed retired judge R.A.Mehta as Lokayukta, whose name was not among those submitted by the state government. The Gujarat state government moved the High Court to quash the appointment on the ground that the Governor made the appointment without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister. Section 3 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Act, provides in part that “the Governor shall by warrant under his hand and seal, appoint a person to be known as Lokayukta”. The Governor acted under this section to make the appointment of Lokayukta. However, the state government has argued that section 3 has to be understood in light of Article 163(1) of the Constitution. Article 163(1) provides that the Governor shall be aided and advised in the exercise of his functions by a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head. Thus, as per this line of argument, the Governor violated the provision of Article 163(1) when she failed to take the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister before exercising the function of appointing the Lokayukta. At the time of writing this post, news reports suggested that the two judges hearing the case are divided over the issue. It remains to be seen whether this issue will be referred to a larger bench. The outcome of this case could have wider implications on the constitutional role of governors if it sets guideposts on the extent to which they act independent of the advice of the council of ministers.
