In India, one of the common threads that run through many of the corruption scandals is the issue of conflict of interest i.e. public officials taking policy decisions based on their personal interest. For example, Shashi Tharoor in the IPL controversy or Ashok Chavan in the Adarsh Housing Society scam. Many countries take measures to minimize conflict of interest of its MPs by regulating membership of parliamentarians in Committees, making it mandatory for them to declare pecuniary interest, and restricting employment both during and after completion of tenure. For example, the US Senate has a detailed Code of Official Conduct that provides guidelines on conflict of interest. India also has some measures in place to minimize conflict of interest. These are codified in the Code of Conduct for Ministers, Code of Conduct for Members of the Rajya Sabha, Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha and Handbook for Members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. Every Rajya Sabha MP has to declare his or her interest (along with assets and liabilities). He has to declare five pecuniary interests: remunerative directorship, remunerated activity, majority shareholding, paid consultancy and professional engagement. Lok Sabha MPs can object to another MP joining a parliamentary committee on grounds that he has personal, pecuniary or direct interest. (For more details, see PRS note on Conflict of Interest Issues in Parliament). On December 1, 2010, PRS held its annual Conference on Effective Legislatures. One of the topics discussed was MPs and Conflict of Interest: Issues and Resolution. Panelists included D Raja, Prakash Javdekar and Supriya Sule. Issues such as requirement for transparency, expertise of legislators, election of honest legislators, and ethical media were discussed. The issues that were raised during the discussion are summarised in the PRS Summary of Proceedings from the Conference.
During the recess, the Departmentally Related Standing Committees of Parliament examine the Demand for Grants submitted by various Ministries. The Demand for Grants are detailed explanations of that Ministry's annual budget which form part of the total budget of the government. These are examined in detail, and the committees can approve of the demands, or suggest changes. The Demand for Grants are finally discussed and voted on by the Parliament after the recess. (The post below lists the ministries whose Demand for Grants will be discussed in detail after the recess). The issue is - how effective is the institution of Parliament in examining the budget? Though India specific information on this subject is hard to find, K. Barraclough and B. Dorotinsky have cited the World Bank - OECD Budget procedures Database to formulate a table on the legislature approving the budget presented by the executive ("The Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process: A Comparative Review", Legislative Oversight and Budgeting). I reproduce the table below:
| In Practice, does the legislature generally approve the budget as presented by the Executive? (in percent) | ||||
| Answer | All Countries | OECD Countries | Presidential democracies | Parliamentary democracies |
| It generally approves the budget with no changes | 34 | 33 | 14 | 41 |
| Minor changes are made (affecting less than 3% of total spending) | 63 | 67 | 71 | 59 |
| Major changes are made (affecting more than 3% but less than 20% of total spending) | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| The budget approved is significantly different (affecting more than 20% of total spending) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sources: K. Barraclough and B. Dorotinsky; PRS. | ||||
