Recently, the Parliament passed a law that addresses the issue of sexual harassment in the work place. The Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha on December 7, 2010, drew on the 1997 judgment of the Supreme Court (known as the Vishaka judgment) to codify measures that employers need to take to address sexual harassment at the work place. (See PRS analysis of the Bill here). The Bill was first passed in the Lok Sabha on September 3, 2011. It incorporated many of the amendments recommended by the Standing Committee on Human Resource Development that examined the Bill. The Rajya Sabha passed it on February 27, 2013 without any new amendments (see Bill as passed by Parliament). We compare the key provisions of the Bill, the Standing Committee recommendations and the Bill that was passed by Parliament (for a detailed comparison, see here).
| Bill as introduced | Standing Committee recommendations | Bill as passed by Parliament |
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Clause 2: Status of domestic workers |
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| Excludes domestic workers from the protection of the Bill. | The definition should include (i) domestic workers; and (ii) situations involving ‘victimization’; | Includes domestic worker. Does not include victimisation. |
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Clause 4: Constitution of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) |
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| The committee shall include 4 members: a senior woman employee, two or more employees and one member from an NGO committed to the cause of women. | The strength of ICC should be increased from 4 to at least 5 (or an odd number) to facilitate decisions in cases where the bench is divided. | Disqualifies a member if (a) he has been convicted of an offence or an inquiry is pending against him or (b) he is found guilty in disciplinary proceedings or a disciplinary proceeding is pending against him. |
| Members may not engage in any paid employment outside the office. | Barring paid employment outside the office goes against NGO members who may be employed elsewhere. This clause must be edited. | Deletes the provision that disallows NGO members to engage in paid employment outside. NGO members to be paid fees or allowances. |
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Clause 6: Constitution and jurisdiction of Local Complaints Committee (LCC) |
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| An LCC is required to be constituted in every district and additional LLCs at block level. At the block level the additional LCC will address complaints where the complainant does not have recourse to an ICC or where the complaint is against the employer. | The functions of the district level and the block level LCCs are not delineated clearly. It is also unclear whether the block level LCCs are temporary committees constituted for dealing with specific cases. Instead of creating additional LCCs at the block level, the District level LCC may be allowed to handle cases. A local member from the block may be co-opted as a member to aid the LCC in its task. | Accepted. |
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Clause 10: Conciliation |
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| The ICC/ LCC shall provide for conciliation if requested by the complainant. Otherwise, it shall initiate an inquiry. | Distinction should be made between minor and major offences. Conciliation should be allowed only for minor offences. | Adds a proviso that monetary settlement shall not be the basis on which conciliation is made. |
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Clause 11: Inquiry into Complaint |
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| ICC/LCC shall proceed to make inquiry into a complaint in such manner as may be prescribed. | No suggestion. | Inquiries will be conducted in accordance with service rules or in such manner as may be prescribed.For domestic workers, the LCC shall forward the complaint to the police within seven days if a prima facie case exists. The case shall be registered under section 509 of Indian Penal Code (word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman). |
| Sources: The Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at Work Place Bill, 2010; the Standing Committee on HRD Report on the Bill; the Sexual Harassment at Work Place (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Bill, 2012; PRS. | ||
There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.
